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 Private Problem, Public Solution:  
 Affirmative Action in the 21st Century 
 
by 
 
Darlene C. Goring* 
 
 
[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is strict in theory, 
but fatal in fact. . . . The unhappy persistence of both the practice and 
the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in 
this country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not 
disqualified from acting in response to it.1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
At some point during the ninety-nine years between the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Plessy v. Ferguson 2 and its decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena,3 the concepts of race, color and ethnicity were eradicated as constitutionally 
relevant factors in the Equal Protection paradigm, or so the argument goes.4  Clearly, 
                    
*  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law, B.B.A., Howard 
University; J.D. and L.L.M., Northwestern University School of Law.  I would like to thank 
Leonard S. Rubinowitz for his continued support and encouragement.  I would also like to 
thank Mark T. Hurst and Carol Parris for their valuable research assistance. 
1  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)(O'Connor, J.). 
2  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
3  Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 200. 
4  See generally Sean M. Scott, Justice Redefined: Minority-Targeted Scholarships and the 
Struggle Against Racial Oppression, 62 UMKC L.REV. 651 (1994).  In this article Professor 
Scott argues that the Supreme Court’s color-blind interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause “perpetuates a concept of racial justice that is defined by the dominant, not the 
outside, group and leads to the continued racial oppression of African-Americans.”  Id. at 
668.  He similarly argues that a race-neutral constitutional paradigm is both judicially and 
socially misleading.  He notes that: 
The strategy of color blindness is being questioned as is the 
assumption that a color-blind society will be the equivalent of a racially 
equal and just society.  Those professing color-blindness confuse the 
recognition of race, and the difference that race makes, with racism.  There 
is an increased rejection of the concept that to recognize race is the 
equivalent of being a racist.  This presumption is being stood on its head 
by outsiders and whites who have begun to listen to the stories of 
outsiders; we posit that not to recognize and acknowledge race is to deny 
the positive value of being African-American or non-white. 
Race-consciousness rejects the assimilationist model inherent to 
color-blindness and instead argues for acculturation and recognition of the 
1
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immutable characteristics such as race, color and ethnicity continue to play important 
roles not only in the American jurisprudential landscape, but in all facets of American 
society.  However, the concept of a color-blind society,5 as first articulated by Justice 
Harlan in his dissenting opinion in Plessy,6 has become a popular justification for 
                                                 
value of being racially different.  It treats difference respectfully and 
recognizes that race plays a critical role in developing perspectives.  It 
advocates the telling of outsider narratives by the oppressed group and 
the hearing of these stories by the privileged group.  It suggests that our 
societal goal should not necessarily be to move beyond race but instead to 
come to value the difference that race makes. 
Id. at 693-94. 
5  For a discussion of the merits of the color-blind constitution see generally, Nicholas deB. 
Katzenbach & Burke Marshall, Not Color Blind: Just Blind, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1998, § 6 
(Magazine) at 42. 
More recently, however, a majority has edged toward pronouncing the 
Constitution “color blind,” coming close to holding legislation that uses 
any racial classification unconstitutional.  Reading the Equal Protection 
Clause to protect whites as well as blacks from racial classification is to 
focus upon a situation that does not and never has existed in our society.  
Unfortunately, it casts doubt upon all forms of racial classification, 
however benign and however focused upon promoting integration.  If 
such a reading is finally adopted by a majority of the Court, it would put a 
constitutional pall over all governmental affirmative action programs and 
even put similar private programs in danger of being labeled 
“discriminatory” against whites and therefore in violation of existing civil 
rights legislation – perhaps the ultimate stupidity. 
Id. 
But see Marquez Lundin, The Call for a Color-Blind Law, 30 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 407 
(1997).  Marquez rejects the use of the strict scrutiny analysis to determine the constitutional 
validity of race-based preferences, and instead argues that “governmental race-based action 
should always be impermissible.”  Id. at 408.  He notes that: 
A color-blind law will not only heal our racial divide, it is also the surest 
protection for the rights of all minority groups.  One need look no further 
than Korematsu  to see that as long as race can be used at all, it can be 
used for ill.  It is tragic that the search for racial equality has turned into a 
battle for racial classification and the division of rights and benefits on that 
basis. 
Id. at 456. 
6  See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559. 
But in view of the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this 
country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.  There is no caste 
here.  Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates 
classes among citizens.  In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal 
before the law. 
2
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attacking remedial efforts that seek to eliminate the continuing effects of discrimination 
on racial and ethnic minority groups.7  
 
Although the concept of race neutrality is implicit in the Court's interpretation 
of a color-blind constitution, it does not mean however, that race or ethnicity cannot be 
used as a constitutionally permissible criterion in the allocation of resources8.  On the 
contrary, it means that if used, race-based classifications must be able to withstand the 
strict constitutional scrutiny that is the cornerstone of the Court's interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.9  This analytical paradigm 
                                                 
Id. 
7  See generally Wooden v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys., et, 32 F. Supp.2d 1370 (S.D. Ga. 
1999); Gratz v. Bollinger, et al., 183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Grutter v. Bollinger, 16 F. 
Supp.2d 797 (E.D Mich. 1998); Smith v. University of Washington Law School, 2 F. Supp.2d 
1324 (W.D. Wash. 1998); Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994); Hopwood v. State 
of Tex., 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996); DeRonde v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 625 P.2d 220 (Cal. 
1981); Regents of University of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 
U.S. 312 (1974).  See also  Nicholas deB. Katzenbach & Burke Marshall, Not Color Blind: Just 
Blind, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1998, § 6 (Magazine) at 42: 
Affirmative action programs, whether to avoid present bias or to remedy 
the effects of three centuries of discrimination against African-Americans, 
are race-based.  The problems they seek to cure are and have been race-
based.  They stem from history–the political, economic and social 
domination of blacks by a white majority that regarded blacks as inferior.  
Undoubtedly there are blacks who are biased against whites and who, 
given the power to do so, would discriminate against them.  Of course, 
given the power, it would be as morally wrong for them to do so as it has 
been for whites.  But discrimination by blacks against whites is not 
America’s problem.  It is not the problem that predominantly white 
legislatures, businesses and universities seek to solve through affirmative 
action programs. 
Id. 
8  The modern origin of a color-blind society can be traced to the “I Have a Dream” speech 
delivered by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr on August 28, 1963 at the Lincoln Memorial in 
Washington, D.C.  He stated that “I have a dream that my four little children will one day live 
in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but the content of their 
character.”  DEBORAH GILLAN STRAUB , AFRICAN AMERICAN VOICES 211 (1996).  Dr. King’s 
words continue to resonate throughout American society, but the color-blind society 
envisioned by Dr. King could not have included a nation where the vestiges of racial 
discrimination were eliminated without a simultaneous recognition of the impact that racial 
discrimination had on the African American society.  
9  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.   
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
3
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requires an initial finding of a constitutionally compelling justification for the use of the 
race-based criterion.  Supreme Court case law is clear - the goal of eliminating 
discrimination or remedying the present effects of past discriminatory practices can 
serve as a compelling justification for the use of race-based classifications.10  Proof of 
broad societal discrimination will not withstand constitutional scrutiny.  Additionally, the 
discriminatory conduct must have been performed by the party implementing the race-
based remedy.  Strict scrutiny also mandates that the race-based remedy be narrowly 
tailored to address the harm resultant from such past discriminatory conduct. 
 
Notwithstanding the scope and breadth of conflicting views generated by this 
paradigm, the Court has clearly embraced this racially neutral interpretation of the strict 
scrutiny test, and incorporated it into the Equal Protection paradigm.  The goal of this 
Article is not to enter into that debate, but to work within the analytical parameters 
currently established by the Court to address unresolved issues.  For example, is the 
racially neutral interpretation of the strict scrutiny test so strict that most, if not all, 
race-based criteria will be stricken?  If so, is the Court willing to recognize a broader 
range of constitutionally permissible justifications for the use of race-based 
classifications?11  This Article embraces the Court's color-blind interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause as the standard against which race-based affirmative action 
preferences will be measured, and proposes strategies aimed at satisfying this 
heightened constitutional standard.   
 
The Court’s racially neutral interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment has 
given opponents of race-based preferences significant ammunition in their efforts to 
eliminate affirmative action programs.  Although the attack on race-based affirmative 
action has occurred on many fronts, this Article will focus on the field on higher 
education.12  Recent judicial and legislative attacks on race-based affirmative action 
                                                 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
10  Pursuant to Justice Powell’s opinion in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265 an unresolved question remains regarding the continued permissibility of diversity 
as a compelling justification for the use of race-based criteria.  Id. 
11  See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O’Connor J., concurring) 
And certainly nothing the Court has said today necessarily forecloses the 
possibility that the Court will find other governmental interests which have 
been relied upon in the lower courts but which have not been passed on 
here to be sufficiently “important” or “compelling” to sustain the use of 
affirmative action policies. 
Id. 
12  Also note that others have limited their analysis of affirmative action programs to the field 
of higher education.  See generally, WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE 
RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY 
ADMISSIONS xxv (1998). 
This study is limited in several important respects.  First, we are concerned 
4
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preferences by colleges and universities across the country are beginning to take their 
toll.  During the past few years, there has been a tremendous decrease in the number of 
racial and ethnic minority students enrolling in and successfully completing college and 
professional schools.13  In addition, the challenge to race-based affirmative action 
programs is being systematically spearheaded by well-funded, conservative public 
interest groups who are underwriting legal efforts to eliminate race-based affirmative 
                                                 
solely with higher education.  In our view, one problem with much of the 
debate over affirmative action is that it lumps together a large number of 
highly disparate areas and programs, ranging from the awarding of 
contracts to minority-owned businesses to policies governing hiring and 
promotion to the admissions policies of colleges and universities.  The 
arguments that pertain to one area may or may not apply in other areas.  It 
is noteworthy, for example, that the plaintiffs in the Piscataway case, 
which centered on the layoff of a white secondary school teacher, took 
pains in their final brief to ask the Supreme Court not to confuse the job-
specific issues that confronted the plaintiff with the much broader, and 
rather different, sets of considerations that face educational institutions in 
deciding whom to admit. 
Id. 
13  See generally, The Declining Enrollments of Blacks in Schools of Architecture, 23 J. 
BLACKS HIGHER ED. 35 (1999);Adam Cohen/Irvine,“When the Field is Level in California, 
Minority Students are “Cascading out of Top Schools and into the Second Tier.  Is This 
Good For Them?”, TIME, July 5, 1999, at 30; Nancy Cantor, Affirmative Action: What 
Michigan can really learn from California, Opinion, Det. News, May 17, 1999, at A10; Black 
Enrollments Drop at Harvard Law School, 23 J. BLACKS HIGHER ED. 135 (1999); Minority 
Entrants to California Med Schools Down 32 Percent, MED. & HEALTH, Apr. 26, 1999, 
available in 1999 WL 10391837; Kenneth R. Weiss, Minority Admissions at UC Almost at 
1997 Level Education: Sharp Drop had followed end of affirmative action last year.  Top 
campuses have not fully rebounded, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1999, at A1; Kenneth R. Weiss, UC 
Board Expected to Ok Davis Plan to Admit Top 4% Education: Another 3,600 students a 
year would be eligible to attend.  Davis has said minority enrollment would increase, but 
officials say impact would be minimal, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1999 at A1; Karen Brown, 
Students protest UMass shift on admissions, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 4, 1999, at B2; Mary Ann 
Roser, College Admission law has mixed results, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Dec. 28, 1998, at 
A1; Jayne Noble Suhler, Minority enrollment increases at Texas universities But schools 
still show diversity disparities, state report says, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 23, 1998, at 
1A; Linda Wertheimer & Claudio Sanchez, The growth in the number of blacks, Latinos and 
other minorities at U.S. colleges and universities has been declining for nearly a decade.  A 
new report released today says that lower academic achievement and graduation rates from 
high school are partly responsible.  The study also concludes that the roll back in 
Affirmative Action in some states is having a chilling effect across the nation, ALL THINGS 
CONSIDERED, Sept. 24, 1998, available in 1998 WL 3646569; Kenneth Weiss, Fewer Blacks and 
Latinos Enroll at UC Education: Declines are sharpest at top campuses, while numbers 
increase at Irvine, Riverside and Santa Cruz, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1998, at A3. 
5
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action programs from the landscape of the American college and university system.14  
In response to these well organized legal and political challenges to affirmative action, 
this Article attempts to re-introduce an important player into the equation - the federal 
government.  In an area as vital to the political and social advancement of racial and 
ethnic minorities as education, we must shift our emphasis from fighting individual 
battles to preserve these programs, and instead look to Congress for remedial measures 
that seek to eradicate a problem that is of national importance.15 
 
This Article will explore the origins of the Court’s color-blind interpretation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the role that this interpretation plays in the development 
of new barriers against challenges to race-based affirmative action programs.  Part II of 
this Article traces the development and application of the strict scrutiny test to evaluate 
the constitutionality of both invidious and benign racial classifications.  Part III 
                    
14  At the forefront of the battle challenging race-based affirmative action programs is The 
Center for Individual Rights ("CIR").  CIR is a non-for-profit public interest law firm that draws 
support from a number of attorneys who work for CIR on a pro bono basis.  The mission of 
this law firm is to defend "individual rights, with particular emphasis on civil rights, freedom 
of speech, the free exercise of religion, and sexual harassment law.  CIR provides free legal 
representation to deserving clients who cannot otherwise obtain or afford legal counsel and 
whose individual rights are threatened.”  CIR (last modified Sept. 9, 1999) <http://www.cir-
usa.org/mission.htm>.  
For a critical evaluation of the goals of this organization, see Theodore Cross, African-
American Opportunities in Higher Education: What Are the Racial Goals for The Center for 
Individual Rights?, 23 J. BLACKS HIGHER ED. 94 (1999). 
15  See Dr. A'lelia Robinson Henry, Perpetuating Inequality: Plessy v. Ferguson and the 
Dilemma of Black Access to Public and Higher Education, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 47 (1998). 
In the time since the Brown decision called upon the states to dismantle 
their segregationist systems of public and higher education, the 
educational gains of African Americans have been nothing short of 
monumental. In 1994, African Americans received more undergraduate and 
graduate degrees than at any time history, and most of these individuals 
were the products of TWIs. The TWIs are now the major producers of 
black professionals and doctorates. In 1994, approximately 834,000 African 
Americans were enrolled in 4-year undergraduate institutions, and 615,000 
in community colleges. 111,000 African Americans were enrolled in 
graduate school, which represented a 66 percent increase over the 
previous decade. Over this same period, the number of blacks in 
professional school rose from 13,000 to 22,000. In the years between years 
of 1985 and 1993, the number of African Americans who received the 
bachelor's degrees increased by 8 percent, and those who received the 
master's degree by 42 percent. In 1995, the number of doctoral degrees 
awarded to African Americans reached an all-time high, rising 17 percent 
over the previous year, from 1095 to 1,287. 
Id. at 62-63. 
6
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examines Justice Powell’s position that racial classifications used as remedial measures 
may overcome the presumption of constitutional invalidity associated with the use of 
race-based classifications.  In this context, the Court recognizes that the continued 
impact of past and present discriminatory practices serves as a barrier to the ability of 
racial and ethnic minorities to equally participate in the American social, political, and 
economic process. 
 
Part IV of this Article focuses on whether the strict scrutiny test may be 
satisfied by implementation of Congressionally mandated race-based remedial programs. 
 By distinguishing the application of the strict scrutiny test used to evaluate municipal 
and state remedial efforts from the more deferential standard used to evaluate 
Congressionally mandated programs, I argue that §516 of the Fourteenth Amendment, in 
concert with the enforcement powers set forth in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (hereinafter referred to as Title VI),17 authorizes Congress to determine whether 
discrimination or the effects of past discrimination continue to influence the racial and 
ethnic composition of educational institutions within the field of higher education.  If 
convincing proof of discrimination is found, Congress may implement remedial race-
based programs to increase the number of racial and ethnic minority group members 
within both public and private educational institutions that receive federal funding.   
 
II.  THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION - 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRICT SCRUTINY TEST  
 
The guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause18 serve as the foundation upon 
which the Court evaluates the role that racial classifications play in the allocation of 
societal rights and privileges.19  This Clause provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o State 
                    
16  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.  (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article.”) 
17  Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that “[n]o person in the United States 
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance.”  42 U.S.C §2000d (1964). 
18  The Supreme Court does not look upon race-based classifications with favor.  See Shaw v. 
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993)(“[c]lassifications of citizens  solely on the basis of race are by 
their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of 
equality.”) 
19  See also  Nicholas deB. Katzenbach & Burke Marshall, Not Color Blind: Just Blind, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1998, § 6 (Magazine) at 42. 
If problems of race are to be solved, they must be seen as the race-based 
problems they are.  It is this aspect of the controversy that recent 
decisions of the Supreme Court have brought into question.  The Equal 
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment was designed to insure that 
former slaves and their descendants were entitled to the same legal 
7
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shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”20  
To effectuate the protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment, the use of race-
based classifications, although not expressly prohibited, “must be analyzed by a 
reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”21  This heightened level of scrutiny did not 
always exist.  Although the language of the Fourteenth Amendment represented a 
significant evolution in the legal protection afforded initially to African Americans,22 the 
Supreme Court’s initial interpretation of these rights was not consistent with the 
Amendment’s facial guarantees of equal protection.  
 
Former Chief Justice Earl Warren characterized the Supreme Court’s early 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as flawed and without foresight.23  In 
                                                 
protection as white citizens.  Like the 13th Amendment abolishing slavery 
and the 15th guaranteeing the right to vote regardless of race, it was clearly 
and unequivocally aimed at racial problems – in today’s terminology “race 
based.”  The Equal Protection Clause has never been viewed as preventing 
classification of citizens for governmental reasons as long as the 
legislative classification was “reasonable” in terms of its purpose. 
Id. 
20 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
21 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).  Reliance on a strict 
constitutional evaluation of racial classifications originates with language from Supreme 
Court opinions in Hirabayashi v. U.S., and Korematsu v. U.S.: 
[I]t should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail 
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not 
to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional.  It is to say that 
courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.  Pressing public 
necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial 
antagonism never can. 
Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1994). 
22  Prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the rights of black 
Americans, although freed from slavery by the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865, were severely 
limited.  For example, "'[l]iberty' in the Fourteenth Amendment, for which the States were to 
ensure equal protection was, for Black Americans, primarily a freedom from slavery and all the 
common incidents of slavery.  Slaves had been denied freedom of movement and now, with 
the Equal Protection Clause, this aspect of liberty was to be accorded to Black Americans 
everywhere in the land."  CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE INTENDED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 254 (1997).  See also  JAMES E. BOND, NO EASY WALK TO FREEDOM 
(1997); JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1984). 
23  EARL WARREN, Fourteenth Amendment: Retrospect and Prospect, in THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT: CENTENNIAL VOLUME 212 (Bernard Schwartz, ed., 1970).  See also  A. LEON 
HIGGINBOTHAM,  JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 118 (1996)(“Although the Court’s erroneous construction of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prevailed for over a half-century, the overwhelming consensus today 
is that Plessy was an untenable statement of the law that set in motion an era of oppression 
8
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reflecting on the historic role of the Court, he concluded that:  
 
the court’s fundamental error was in denying Congress a meaningful 
role in Fourteenth Amendment enforcement. The Negro faced a 
variety of barriers  - some obvious and some quite subtle - in his 
struggle to become a full and equal member of American society, and 
the federal courts were simply not equipped to undertake the broad 
range of programs necessary to tear down those barriers.  Those 
courts could proceed only on a case-by-case basis in their efforts to 
relate abstract notions of equality with the real world of racial 
prejudice, discrimination and distrust.  The judicial conclusion in 
Plessy v. Ferguson that separation of the races satisfied the 
constitutional command of equality dramatically illustrated that 
abstract judicial concepts will not necessarily reflect the real world.24  
 
Characterizing the Plessy decision as a judicial example of “fundamental error” 
does not do justice to the six decades of oppressive constitutional jurisprudence that it 
spawned.25  In Plessy26 the Court refused to invalidate state legislation that required 
                                                 
from which our nation still has not fully recovered.”) 
24  EARL WARREN, Fourteenth Amendment: Retrospect and Prospect, in THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT: CENTENNIAL VOLUME 212, 225 (Bernard Schwartz, ed., 1970) 
The remarkable feature of the Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment 
decisions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is that they 
failed to grasp the importance of the nation’s commitment to equality and 
the increasingly desperate plight of the Negro.  Perhaps this failing is 
particularly apparent to us at this period in history when racial problems 
seem to dominate our national life. 
Id. at 224-225. 
25  A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Life of the Law: Values, Commitment, and Craftsmanship, 
100 HARV. L.REV. 795 (1987). 
The Supreme Court in Plessy placed its imprimatur on state-imposed racial 
segregation and left to the “large discretion . . . of the legislature” the 
determination whether the state would separate and treat black people 
differently than it did any other group-- majority or minority--in American 
society. In the context of the times, the Court's reference to the 
“established usages, customs and traditions of the people” was nothing 
less than a mandate for states to revert to the past biases, prejudices, and 
discrimination that had provided the rationale for slavery and America's 
earlier legitimization of racism--the very racism that was the target of the 
thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments. The majority's thinly 
veiled reversion to a slavery-type jurisprudence, despite its invocation of 
the fourteenth amendment, was revealed by its frequent citations to and 
reliance upon many cases that predated the enactment of the fourteenth 
9
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separate accommodations based on racial distinction.  Specifically, the Court upheld a 
Louisiana statute, passed in 1890, which provided for “separate railway carriages for 
the white and colored races.”27  The mere fact that the Court permitted Homer Plessy28 
to assert a judicial challenge to this statute evidenced an evolution in the American legal 
system’s recognition of African Americans as citizens of the United States, and 
therefore entitled them to equal application of the privileges and immunities arising 
therefrom.29  However, equal access to the judicial system did not guarantee equal 
                                                 
amendment. 
Although many lower courts had explicitly endorsed “Jim Crow 
segregation” prior to Plessy, the significance of the Supreme Court's 
affirmation of the doctrine of 'separate but equal' in 1896 cannot be 
underestimated. The Court's approval was the final and therefore the most 
devastating judicial step in the legitimization of racism under state law. In 
numerous subsequent school cases, state and federal courts continued to 
approve racial discrimination and segregation; most of those courts or 
counsel of record cited or relied upon Plessy as support for expansive 
endorsements of racial subjugation. 
Id. at 805-7. 
26  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) overruled by 347 U.S. 483 (1954).   
27  Plessy, 163 U.S. at 540.  Plessy argued that: 
he was entitled to every right, privilege, and immunity secured to citizens 
of the United States of the white race; and that, upon such theory, he took 
possession of a vacant seat in a coach where passengers of the white race 
were accommodated, and was ordered by the conductor to vacate said 
coach, and take a seat in another, assigned to persons of the colored race, 
and, having refused to comply with such demand, he was forcibly ejected, 
with the aid of a police officer, and imprisoned in the parish jail to answer a 
charge of having violated the above act. 
Id. at 541-42.   
28  Plessy, 163 U.S. at 541.  This was not a typical case, but one specifically designed to test 
the constitutionality of this statute.  See ELLIS COSE, COLOR-BLIND (1997) 
As a test of Louisiana's Separate Car Act, Homer Adolph Plessy provoked 
a prearranged confrontation by sitting in the first-class “white” section of 
a train on the East Louisiana Railway.  Plessy's blood was, by his own 
reckoning, only one-eighth “African.”  And as the Court noted in its 
decision, 'the mixture of colored blood was not discernible in him. 
Id. at 17. 
29  Prior to Plessy, Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 404 (1856) governed the ability of African 
Americans to participate in the American judicial process.  (“We think they [African 
Americans] are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, 
under the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and 
privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States.”) 
See also  BRYAN K. FAIR, NOTES OF A RACIAL CASTE BABY  95 (1997), which discusses the 
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treatment within its boundaries. 
 
The court viewed the concept of equality as contemplated by the Fourteenth 
Amendment in Plessy as a way to “enforce the absolute equality of the two races before 
the law,”30 but not, as Justice Brown noted, “to abolish distinctions based upon color, 
or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the 
two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.”31  This ruling evidenced an important 
distinction between legal and social equality that continues to permeate all facets of 
American society.32  This distinction also served as the framework for the ‘separate but 
                                                 
continuing impact of the Dred Scott decision.  Professor Fair writes that “Taney’s opinion in 
Dred Scott was one of the most decisive moments in the nationalization of white supremacy 
in America, as his opinion gave judicial sanction to the commodification and subordination of 
all blacks, whether slave or free, to exclude them from the federal courts.  This decision shows 
that the malign racial attitudes of whites toward blacks changed very little between the 
seventeenth and nineteenth centuries.  Even today, one sees evidence of Taney’s beliefs.  
For example, many whites still live away from blacks as if Blacks were unfit to associate with.  
Many whites continue to enroll their children at schools and universities with virtually no 
black students or teachers.  Many whites refuse to support black political candidates, 
especially in statewide or national elections.”  Id. at 95. 
30  Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544.   
31  Id. 
32  See Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer’s Fiftieth Anniversary: “A Time for Keeping;A 
Time for Throwing Away?,” 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 61, 77-78, (1998): 
In 1896, the Court, in Plessy v. Ferguson, justified segregation by 
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment as enforcing civil and political 
equality, but not social equality. Faced with legislative and judicial 
commands to equalize civil and political rights, "states seeking to 
disenfranchise African-Americans successively experimented with the 
grandfather clause, residency and literacy requirements, and 'privatization' 
through the white primary, as well as the familiar tactics of racist 
intimidation and discriminatory administration of facially neutral 
registration statutes."  Overt race-based distinctions continued to appear 
in the "sphere of so- called social rights" such as "marriage, education, 
public transportation, and accommodation." In fact, beginning in the 1880s 
and "gathering steam after Plessy v. Ferguson was decided, the Southern 
states passed laws that not only authorized exclusion and segregation of 
customers on the basis of race, but in fact required such discriminatory 
practices." Additionally, from about 1890 until 1970, other methods of 
subordinating African-Americans were used including social pressure, 
violence, and other wrongful conduct against these citizens. 
It was not until 1954 that the Court in Brown v. Board of 
Education  recognized social equality by striking down the concept of 
segregation as inconsistent with educational equality and declaring that 
the "separate but equal" doctrine adopted in Plessy had no place in the 
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equal’ doctrine that was upheld by the Court in Plessy.33  Justice Brown noted that: 
                                                 
field of public education. Yet, it took another thirteen years after Brown 
before the Court in Loving v. Virginia definitively "adopted a categorical 
presumption against race-based regulation" by declaring that statutes 
prohibiting interracial marriages violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Just before the Court decided Loving, Congress 
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which "ban[s] 'discrimination or 
segregation' in the provision of goods and services, even by private 
entities, on the basis of 'race, color, religion, or national origin,' and 
outlaw[s] discrimination or segregation in employment because of a 
person's 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'  This Act was 
possible because of the civil rights movement and the persistent activities 
of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and his followers from 1954 to 1964, which 
kept the issue of racial inequality before the eyes of the American public. 
Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not end discrimination or racism, 
it represented an "important statutory embodiment of the ideal of racial 
justice" and helped establish a “framework for the resolution of issues of 
race.” 
Id. 
33  Charles E. Ross, Symposium: The Role of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit in the Civil Rights Movement, Experience is the Life of the Law, 16 MISS. C. L. REV. 
347, 350-351 (1996): 
With regard to the Fourteenth Amendment argument, the Plessy Court also 
rejected Plessy's claim by first reasoning that, though the Fourteenth 
Amendment was designed to enforce the "absolute equality of the two 
races before the law," the equality mandated was only "political equality" 
and did not extend to "social equality." To illustrate the difference, the 
Court cited prior precedent holding that a state could not prohibit people 
of the "colored race" from sitting on a jury because such a prohibition 
"implied a legal inferiority in civil society, which lessened the security of 
the right of the colored race, and was a step toward reducing them to a 
condition of servility." The Court rejected this implication with regard to 
the use of railroad cars by passengers, however, on the basis that the 
exercise of the police power to provide separate but equal railroad cars was 
reasonable in that it promoted the public good and was not intended for 
the oppression of a particular class. To buttress its "reasonable" argument, 
the Court noted that even the Congress of the United States required 
separate schools for colored children in the District of Columbia. 
The Court further reasoned that the state of Louisiana, through 
the enforced separation of the two races, was not stamping the colored 
race with a "badge of inferiority," but instead, if members of the colored 
race felt such a stamp, it was they themselves as opposed to the state of 
Louisiana that was imposing the stamp. The Court flatly rejected the 
argument that "equal [social] rights cannot be secured to the negro except 
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[l]aws permitting, and even requiring, their separation, in places where 
they are liable to be brought into contact, do not necessarily imply the 
inferiority of either race to the other, and have been generally, if not 
universally, recognized as within the competency of the state 
legislatures in the exercise of their police power.34  
 
The only limitation, if you will, on the Court’s approval of the ‘separate but 
equal’ doctrine was the requirement that in order to be a valid exercise of police power, 
it “must be reasonable, and extend only to such laws as are enacted in good faith for the 
promotion of the public good, and not for the annoyance or oppression of a particular 
class.”35  This decision and the resulting ‘separate but equal’ doctrine set the country 
upon a social36 and jurisprudential course that was prophetically described by Justice 
                                                 
by an enforced commingling of the two races." Plessy came to stand for 
the proposition that a state could segregate school children according to 
race as long as the facilities in question being provided by the state were 
provided to both races equally. 
Id. 
34  Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544.  (“[T]he enforced separation of the races, as applied to the internal 
commerce of the state, neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the colored man, 
deprives him of his property without due process of law, nor denies him the equal protection 
of the laws, within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. . . . ”). 
35  Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550. 
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in 
the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the 
colored race with a badge of inferiority.  If this be so, it is not by reason of 
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to 
put that construction on it. 
Id. at 551.  But see Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in which he argued that “[t]he arbitrary 
separation of citizens, on the basis of race, while they are on a public highway, is a badge of 
servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the law 
established by the constitution.  It cannot be justified upon any legal grounds.”  Id. at 562. 
36  See CARL T. ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS: THE WORLD OF JUSTICE THURGOOD 
MARHSALL 7, n. 7 (1993)(“‘Jim Crow’ describes a practice or policy of segregation or 
discrimination against Negroes in public places, public vehicles, employment, schools, etc.  
The term derives from a song sung by Thomas Rice in a mid-1800s Negro minstrel show.”);  
RALPH E. LUKER, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 133-34 (1997) 
Jim Crow.  A term which refers to a wide variety of legal and extralegal 
practices of racial discrimination in the United States in the nineteenth and 
first half of the twentieth centuries.  The term had its origin in a white 
minstrel show popular across the North in the 1830s.  In it, Thomas 
Dartmouth “Daddy” Rice, appearing in blackface, danced and sang a 
number called “Jump Jim Crow.”  Later, the white South reacted to 
emancipation and the end of Reconstruction by enacting laws separating 
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Harlan as “pernicious.”37 
                                                 
the races, restricting the franchise of African Americans and confirming 
social mores that discriminated against them.  These laws and mores were 
called “Jim Crow.”  In law, they banned intermarriage, disfranchised 
African Americans by a variety of provisions and mandated separate 
housing, public accommodations, schools, and transportation. 
Id.  See also, HENRY J. ABRAHAM & BARBARA A. PERRY, FREEDOM AND THE COURT: CIVIL 
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 332-33 (7th ed. 1998) 
The Court’s position, as noted earlier . . . , was that the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not place under federal protection “the entire domain of 
civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the states,” and that the 
protection offered by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments was 
against state action only, not against private action.  And in 1896 the Court 
upheld the convenient discriminatory concept of “separate but equal” in 
the case of Plessy v. Ferguson.  To all intents and purposes the black was 
at the mercy of the states-there was no Warren Court to redress 
grievances.  Indeed, until World War II the federal government assumed at 
most a highly limited role in the protection of civil rights on the state level. 
  
Before 1910 almost 90 percent of America’s blacks lived in the 
South and the Border . . . .  the core of racial discrimination was naturally 
found there, on both the public and the private level.  Thus public 
authorities at the state and local levels, usually under the guise of the 
Court-upheld separate but equal concept, enacted measures (sometimes 
taking the form of a constitutional provision) permitting or even requiring 
segregation of buses, streetcars, taxicabs, railroads, waiting rooms, comfort 
stations, drinking fountains, state and local schools, state colleges and 
universities, hospitals, jails, cemeteries, sport facilities, beaches, bath 
houses, swimming pools, parks, golf courses, courthouse cafeterias, 
libraries, dwellings, theaters, hotels, restaurants, and other similar facilities-
be these public, quasi-public, or private in nature; and interracial marriages 
were widely proscribed.  Private individuals and groups, on their own 
initiative, and not infrequently encouraged by state authorities, acted to 
deny blacks, and often other non-Caucasians as well, access to social 
clubs, fraternities and sororities, private schools, colleges, universities, 
churches, cemeteries, funeral parlors, hospitals, hotels, dwellings, 
restaurants, movies, bowling alleys, swimming pools, bath houses . . . .  
There was nothing particularly secretive about either public or private 
discrimination; it was simp ly an accepted way of life-accepted by many 
blacks as well as by almost all whites. 
Id. at 333. 
37  Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559.  Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese 
Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV. 151, 155 (1996) (“Harlan’s opinion also reflected a deserved 
confidence in the power of his analysis; even in 1896, even writing alone, he correctly 
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Justice Harlan attacked the majority decision in Plessy on several fronts.38  In 
addition to predicting continued racial strife,39 he focused on the interplay between the 
use of invidious racial classifications and the language of the then recently ratified 
constitutional amendments.  He argued that the Thirteenth,40 Fourteenth,41 and 
Fifteenth42 Amendments were intended to remove “the race line from our governmental 
systems.”43  Citing the Court’s previous conclusion that race could not be used to 
                                                 
predicted that judicial fiat could not forever impose a policy that was fundamentally wrong.” 
citing Harlan, Plessy Dissent p. 559 (“[T]he judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to 
be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott case.”). 
38  Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 ( Harlan, J.) (“[t]he law regards man as man, and takes no account of 
his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guarantied by the supreme law of the 
land are involved.  It is therefore to be regretted that this high tribunal, the final expositor of 
the fundamental law of the land, has reached the conclusion that it is competent for a state to 
regulate the enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon the basis of race.” ). 
39  Plessy, 163 U.S. at 562 (Harlan, J. dissenting). 
If evils will result from the commingling of the two races upon public 
highways established for the benefit of all, they will be infinitely less than 
those that will surely come from state legislation regulating the enjoyment 
of civil rights upon the basis of race.  We boast of the freedom enjoyed by 
our people above all other peoples.  But it is difficult to reconcile that 
boast with a state of the law which, practically, puts the brand of servitude 
and degradation upon a large class of our fellow citizens,–our equals 
before the law. 
Id.  at 562. 
40  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” 
41  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.   
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Id. 
42  U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude").   
43  Plessy, 163 U.S. at 555.  See ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992). 
[S]tate legislation “conceived in hostility to, and enacted for the purpose 
of humiliating citizens of the United States of a particular race” must be 
“hostile to both the spirit and letter of the Constitution of the United 
15
Goring: Private Problem, Public Solution
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2000
 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:2 
 
disqualify potential jurors, Justice Harlan articulated a more expansive reading of these 
constitutional provisions.  In assessing the rights and immunities afforded to African 
Americans, he concluded that “the constitution of the United States, in its present form, 
forbids, so far as civil and political rights are concerned, discrimination by the general 
government or the states against any citizen because of his race.  All citizens are equal 
before the law.”44 
 
Justice Harlan’s color-blind interpretation of the  constitution is facially 
supportive of the struggle of African Americans.  However, the concept of the ‘color-
blind’ constitution has shortcomings that modern jurists and constitutional scholars 
have seized upon.45  Justice Harlan’s oft-quoted language is a very powerful entreaty 
                                                 
States.”  This is a better explanation of the illegality of racial segregation 
than has yet appeared in any opinion for a majority of the Supreme Court.  
It is not, of course, an argument for a color-blind Constitution.  Racially 
discriminatory legislation may be neither conceived in hostility to, nor 
enacted for the purpose of humiliating, citizens of the United States of a 
particular race.  Alternatively, Jim Crow laws might be rejected on the 
ground that they impose an unreasonable classification, without implying 
any broader rule of antidiscrimination.  Harlan consciously went further: he 
developed an argument for a color-blind Constitution because he was 
unwilling to rely on judges to distinguish a good racial classification from a 
bad one. 
Id. at 121.  EARL WARREN, Fourteenth Amendment: Retrospect and Prospect, in THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: CENTENNIAL VOLUME 212 (Bernard Schwartz, ed., 1970). 
The work of reconstructing the divided and battlescarred nation after the 
Civil War took many forms.  Most relevant for our purposes were the basis 
for the nation's commitment to the concept of equality.  Within five years 
after the guns of the Civil War had been silenced, Congress had proposed 
and the country had ratified three amendments which purported to give the 
newly freed slaves civil and political equality with all other Americans.  
The Thirteenth Amendment told the Negro that slavery could have no 
place in this nation and that he could no longer be treated as chattel, to be 
bought and sold at the caprice of his white master.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment conferred national citizenship on the Negro and told him that 
he could expect due process and equal protection before the law.  The 
Fifteenth Amendment gave the Negro the most potent weapon in the 
democratic arsenal - the vote - and promised him the he could participate 
fully in the American political process.  The three amendments had a 
common feature - they designated the Congress as the governmental body 
that would take action to ensure that the new commitment to equality 
would be fulfilled. 
Id. at 215. 
44  Plessy, 163 U.S. at 556.   
45  See BRYAN K. FAIR, NOTES OF A RACIAL CASTE BABY (1997). 
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What did Harlan mean by his dissent in Plessy?  What was the context for 
his insistence that the American Constitution is color blind?  Harlan’s 
primary concern in Plessy was undoing black caste.  He understood the 
implicit message behind segregation statutes: that blacks are inferior, unfit 
to associate with whites.  Harlan did not pronounce his color blindness 
principle in an equal society but, rather, in one in which race was a 
benchmark for status.  He considered the Louisiana law unconstitutional 
because it implied the inferiority of blacks and the superiority of whites.  
However, some commentators have made elaborate arguments that Harlan 
intended that the government never be able to use race as a criterion in its 
decision making, including when the government sought to remedy past 
discrimination or eliminate current caste.  But these arguments take 
Harlan’s statements out of context and turn his color blindness principle 
on its head.  Justice William Brennan observed how Justice Brown’s 
opinion in Plessy turned the equal protection clause against those whom it 
was intended to set free, condemning them to a “separate but equal” 
status before the law, a status always separate but seldom equal.  And 
now some people want to recast Harlan’s dissent against blacks, 
condemning them to racial caste. 
Id. at 102;  Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Hopwood, Bakke and the Future of the Diversity 
Justification, 29 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1998). 
The ongoing debate regarding the constitutionality of racial preferences 
for purposes of affirmative action often focuses on whether the reasons for 
being especially suspicious of invidious racial discrimination are equally 
applicable to "benign" preferences.  To a large extent, contemporary 
disputes over racial preferences tend to pit two different conceptions of 
equal protection in the context of race against each other. The Hopwood 
majority, as well as Justice Scalia, essentially rely on the "colorblind 
principle," which holds that any consideration of race in governmental 
decision making, other than for strictly remedial purposes, is presumptively 
unconstitutional.  This conclusion may arise for some or all of the 
following reasons: such consideration of race is inconsistent with the 
original understanding of equal protection, is premised on assumptions of 
racial inferiority, denigrates the individual through the use of irrelevant and 
racially based stereotypes, is immoral, is stigmatizing, or leads to enduring 
racialism.  Arguably, Justice Powell applied a softer version of the 
colorblind principle in Bakke, concluding that all racial classifications must 
be strictly scrutinized, but that the non-remedial interest of diversity in 
education could justify a limited use of racial preferences.  A competing 
approach favored by many academics, and partially reflected in the opinion 
of Justice Marshall in Bakke, is known as the "anti-subordination 
principle," which holds that the use of race by the government is wrong 
only when it subordinates any racial group.  The colorblind principle exalts 
the rights of the individual, while the anti-subordination principle 
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for the Court to recognize the equal constitutional rights of all people on a race neutral 
basis.  He writes that: 
 
[T]here is no caste here.  Our constitution is color-blind, and neither 
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.  In respect of civil-rights, 
all citizens are equal before the law.  The humblest is the peer of the 
most powerful.  The law regards man as man, and takes no account 
of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guarantied 
by the supreme law of the land are involved.46 
 
Notwithstanding this entreaty, Justice Harlan did not abandon notions of racial 
superiority with respect to societal interaction between the races.  With the 
simultaneous granting of equal constitutional rights, Justice Harlan did not fail to pay 
homage to the continued dominance of the white race.47  He reassures both himself and 
                                                 
emphasizes the rights of racial groups.  Both of these principles usually 
lead to similar results in cases of classic invidious discrimination; however, 
they tend to produce diametrically opposite conclusions in the context of 
affirmative action.  The anti-subordination  approach has been definitively 
rejected by the courts.  Thus, the judicial debate, as reflected by Hopwood, 
has focused on whether the pure colorblind approach of Justice Scalia or 
the more moderate colorblind approach of Justice Powell in Bakke should 
prevail. 
Id. at 5-7; Chris K. Iijima, Swimming From the Island of the Colorblind: Deserting an ill-
conceived Constitutional Metaphor, in Symposium Using Law and Identity to Script 
Cultural Production, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. J. 583 (1997): 
Unfortunately, the colorblind myth of racial vision confuses the ideological 
end to racial hierarchy with what already exists.  That is, the prescriptive 
ideal of a “colorblind” society, in which racism and White supremacy are 
eradicated, has been transformed by judicial fiat into “a condition of 
societal denial,” creating the illusion that racial hierarchy has been 
eliminated.  Indeed, “denial is a pervasive symptom of contemporary 
American racism.”  And, of course, the denial of reality merely perpetuates 
the condition of racial subordination. 
Id. at 591.  See also  other discussions of constitutional color-blindness, REVA B. SIEGEL, The 
Racial Rhetorics of Colorblind Constitutionalism: The Case of Hopwood v. Texas, in RACE 
AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 29 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin, eds., 1998); 
CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON'T GO BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 67-87 (1997); Cedric Merlin Powell, Blinded by Color: The New Equal 
Protection, the Second Deconstruction, and Affirmative Inaction, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 191 
(1997); JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, CULTURE, AND 
JUSTICE IN AMERICA (1996); ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992). 
46  Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559.   
47  Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV. 
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his constituency that  
 
[t]he white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.  
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and 
in power.  So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it 
remains true to its great heritage, and holds fast to the principles of 
constitutional liberty.48   
 
After 58 years the Court abandoned Plessy's ‘separate but equal’ doctrine with 
its landmark desegregation decision in Brown v. Board of Education.49  Brown 
represented a clear departure from the Court’s prior interpretation of the constitutional 
validity of state-sponsored segregation.50  The Court decisively rejected ‘separate but 
                                                 
151, 157 (1996). 
Harlan's comments about the Chinese in the Plessy dissent strike the 
modern ear as racist. Harlan, of course, was well aware of the 
discrimination imposed upon Chinese by the national government; they 
could neither immigrate nor become citizens, disadvantages imposed on no 
other race at that time. Harlan must also have known that this federal 
discrimination perpetuated a system of disadvantage imposed by the 
states. Aliens "ineligible to citizenship," a category that was essentially 
limited to Asians, were subject to various legal disabilities, such as 
prohibitions on entering licensed professions and owning real property.  
However, Harlan's reaction to disadvantages imposed on Chinese by law 
was not that they should be invalidated according to his color-blindness 
principle. In this respect, Harlan's response not only failed to comport with 
modern arguments about the anti-subordination purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it did not even satisfy the notion of simple formal equality. 
Instead, Harlan made what seems to have been an early 
"underinclusiveness" argument similar to that found in modern equal 
protection analysis: the law was irrational because it burdened one 
despised minority but not another, and the one that was not burdened was 
even more worthy of segregation from Caucasians. 
Id. at 157-158. 
48  Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559. 
49  Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
50  This departure was not totally unexpected.  During the 18 years preceding the Brown 
decision, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund systematically litigated graduate school 
desegregation cases.  See State of Missouri v. Gaines, 305 U.S. 337 (1938)(Furthering of the 
'separate but equal' doctrine, the Court ordered the State of Missouri to either admit Lloyd 
Gaines to its School of Law or provide an equivalent facility within the State.  Unfortunately, 
Gaines' mysterious disappearance mooted any further action in this case); Pearson v. Murray, 
182 Atl. Rpt. 590 (1936)(ordering the admission of Donald Murray to the University of 
Maryland Law School because there were no other equal  educational opportunities for 
Murray within the State); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 
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equal’ doctrine of Plessy.  Chief Justice Warren’s renunciation of Plessy in this context 
was clear.  He wrote that “in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but 
equal’ has no place.  Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”51  But, the 
Brown court only discussed the psychological harm that African Americans suffered as 
a result of segregation.52  The Brown court failed to expressly repudiate the discussion 
in Plessy regarding the constitutional rights and privileges afforded to African 
Americans in the post-war amendments.53  Nor did the Brown court entertain Justice 
                                                 
(1948)(ordering the admission of Ada Lois Sipuel to the University of Oklahoma School of 
Law);  McLaurin v. Okla. St. Regents for Higher Ed., 339 U.S. 637 (1950)(prohibiting the 
University of Oklahoma from imposing segregatist conditions on McLaurin's admission, such 
as requiring him to "sit apart at a designated desk in an anteroom adjoining the classroom; to 
sit at a designated desk on the mezzanine floor of the library, but not to use the desks in the 
regular reading room; and to sit at a designated table and to eat at a different time from other 
students in the school cafeteria); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629(1950)(holding that the new 
law school the State of Texas established for blacks was unequal to the legal educational 
facilities and opportunities available to white students, and as a result compelled Sweatt's 
admission to the University of Texas  Law School).  See also  JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN 
THE COURT 62-79, 85-91(1994): 
But while Sweatt had appeared to offer a way of winning without ruling on 
the constitutionality of segregation, McLaurin had seemed to present the 
issue of segregation and nothing else.  Nevertheless, saying that 
McLaurin was being treated unequally was not the same as deciding the 
issue of segregation.  Of course, that might mean that all segregation 
amounted to inequality, which the Court carefully avoided saying. 
Id. at 77-78; CARL T. ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS: THE WORLD OF JUSTICE 
THURGOOD MARSHALL (1993): 
There was Marshall the sagacious strategist.  Few of his cases tell more 
about the skills, the personal dedication, the wit and sarcasm of Marshall 
than this broadside attack on Jim Crow in higher education in Oklahoma . . . 
. On January 14, 1946, Ada Sipuel applied for admission [to the University 
of Oklahoma].  Marshall knew that an awful lot was at stake.  He still fumed 
over winning a trailblazing case, the Gaines lawsuit in Missouri, only to 
have Gaines vanish.  In the case of Sipuel, Marshall, Hall, and the other 
NAACP lawyers intended to go far beyond Gaines and try to use the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for wiping out not only “We’ll give you 
tuition to go to school in a northern state,” or “We’ll set up a separate law 
school for you,” but all forms of racial discrimination in graduate and 
professional education. 
Id. at 145-146. 
51  Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
52  Id. at 494 (“To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of 
their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect 
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”) 
53  DONALD G. NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP: AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
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Harlan’s concept of the color-blind constitution, although various manifestations of this 
concept were being incorporated into the American social fabric at the time.54 
 
Although dormant for 58 years, the theory of the color-blind constitution re-
                                                 
ORDER, 1776 TO THE PRESENT  (1991): 
While Warren had no doubt about the proper outcome, he was determined 
to avoid “precipitous action that would inflame [the white South] more 
than necessary.”  This concern rather than abstract legal principles shaped 
his opinion in the Brown case, which was announced on May 17, 1954.  To 
avoid antagonizing whites, Warren refrained from attacking segregation as 
part of a caste system that was designed to preserve white supremacy and 
that was on its face a denial of equal protection.  Rather than suggesting 
that Plessy had been wrongly decided and that southerners had supported 
a blatantly unconstitutional institution for more than a half century, he 
contended that recent developments had made segregation incompatible 
with the guarantees of equal protection.  In recent years public education 
had become far more important than it had been when the Fourteenth 
Amendment had been adopted or when Plessy had been decided.  In fact, 
it now was “a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural 
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him 
adjust normally to his environment.”  Citing recent social science research, 
Warren argued that segregation denied black children the full benefit of 
education and thus put them at a considerable disadvantage. 
Id. at 749. 
54  See RICHARD KLUGER, discusses the relevance of the Brown decision in SIMPLE JUSTICE 749 
(1976)(“Did not mean he would be invited to lunch at the Rotary the following week.  It meant 
something more basic and important.  It meant that black rights had suddenly been redefined; 
black bodies had suddenly been reborn under a new law.  Blacks’ value as human beings had 
changed overnight by the declaration of the nation’s highest court.  At a stroke, the Justices 
had severed the remaining cords of de facto slavery. The Negro could no longer be fastened 
with the status of official pariah.  He was both thrilled that the signal for the demise of his 
caste status had come from on high and angry that it had taken so long and first exacted so 
steep a price in suffering”).  See also  JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 116 (1994): 
Nominally, the Court’s only legal directive in Brown was that states might 
no longer segregate the races in schools.  But in fact the decision 
destroyed the edifice of legitimacy upon which Plessy had placed 
segregation, laid the foundation for the civil rights movement, and 
revolutionized the notions of what courts, lawyers, and the law might do to 
expand racial justice.  And much more, including setting in motion 
consequences for other minorities and disadvantaged groups besides 
blacks, as well as suggesting how the law might be used to advance and 
secure human rights in other countries. 
Id. at 116. 
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emerged in American jurisprudence and sensibilities after the Brown decision.55  The 
Supreme Court had not ignored Justice Harlan’s theory of constitutional color-
blindness.  In fact, Civil Rights activists and members of the NAACP’s Legal Defense 
and Education Fund embraced the concept as an effective method of eliminating 
invidious racial discrimination from society, but did not fully address its long term 
consequences.56  In the years following Brown, the Justices grappled with the 
constitutional dilemma underlying the implementation of race-based remedial measures, 
while simultaneously fostering race neutrality in the Court's interpretation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Justice Powell and Justice O’Connor were at the forefront of this 
judicial struggle, and both adopted the concept of the color-blind constitution in various 
contexts.57  Justice Powell’s consistent support for this principle can be seen in his 
                    
55  See STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE 
NATION INDIVISIBLE 101 (1997). 
Brown remains the most important Supreme Court decision in this century. 
 It marked the beginning of the end of the Jim Crow South.  But it was not 
the end of all laws separating the races, and indeed the Court was clearly 
aware of the limits of its power.  To have barred racial classifications as a 
basis for governmental action - as the NAACP had urged - would have 
meant, for instance, that state laws forbidding interracial marriages were 
also unconstitutional.  Neither in 1954, nor for thirteen years thereafter, 
was that an issue the Court was willing to take on.  Brown was ahead of 
the public opinion curve, but not way ahead. . . .  Declaring the 
Constitution “color-blind” would likely have had another long-term effect: 
later race-conscious policies would have run into constitutional trouble.  
No court could have approved race-based hiring at the Kaiser Aluminum & 
Chemical Corporation; in Boston, Judge Arthur Garrity could not have 
ordered busing to achieve racial balance in public schools.  Both involved 
racial classifications, of which Justice Harlan (it seems safe to say) would 
not have approved. 
Id. 
56  See generally, DONALD G. NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP: AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, 1776 TO THE PRESENT (1991); HENRY J. ABRAHAM & BARBARA A. 
PERRY, FREEDOM AND THE COURT: CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 384-389 
(7th ed. 1998)(discussing non-violent methods used by civil right advocates by eradicate 
insidious forms of racial discrimination); HOWELL RAINES, MY SOUL IS RESTED: MOVEMENT 
DAYS IN THE DEEP SOUTH REMEMBERED (1977)(discussing a collection of interviews with 
people who experienced various facets of the Civil Rights Movement, including politicians, 
grass roots civil rights workers, educators, lawyers and policemen); MICHAEL L. LEVINE, 
AFRICAN AMERICANS AND CIVIL RIGHTS: FROM 1619 TO THE PRESENT  166-208 (1996). 
57  Koteles Alexander, Essay, Adarand: Brute Political Force Concealed as a Constitutional 
Colorblind Principle, 39 HOW.L.J. 367, 376 (1995). 
Presumably, Justices Powell and O’Connor’s attraction to a colorblind 
Constitution is grounded in the idea that it implies both legal and value 
neutrality, and creates a symbolic appearance of inescapable logic.  In a 
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plurality opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,58 and his 
concurring opinion in Fullilove v. Klutznick .59 
 
The concept of constitutional color-blindness was resurrected in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence by Justice Powell in his opinion in Bakke.60  In Bakke, the 
University of California, when faced with a challenge to its race-based medical school 
admissions program, argued that the strict scrutiny analysis was inapplicable because 
claims of “discrimination against members of the white ‘majority’ cannot be suspect if 
its purpose can be characterized as ‘benign.’”61 Justice Powell rejected this argument.  
In order to justify the use of a race-based classification, Justice Powell concluded that 
the strict scrutiny test demands a “judicial determination that the burden he is asked to 
bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”62  
                                                 
vacuum, a colorblind Constitution is precisely what many would want in 
any governing document, particularly with respect to the Equal Protection 
Clause.  Yet, the Court’s sudden rush to a colorblind principle, after over 
two hundred years of ignoring such an egalitarian ideal, misses the mark.  
The resolution of  legal issues involving race cannot be confined to the 
realm of ideas. 
Id. 
58  Regents of the Univ. Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  
59  Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), overruled by Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 
U.S. 200, 235 (1995)("Of course, it follows that to the extent (if any) that Fullilove held federal 
racial classifications to be subject to a less rigorous standard, it is no longer controlling"). 
60  See JOHN C. JEFFRIES , JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. THE ERA OF JUDICIAL BALANCE 469 
(1994). 
On the one hand, Powell concluded, it was simply “too late in the day” to 
forbid all racial preferences.  Outlawing affirmative action would be a 
“disaster for the country.”  Even if he were driven into an intellectual 
corner, Powell would find a way to allow some affirmative action, under 
some circumstances, at least for the time being.  On the other hand, said 
Powell, it would be equally disastrous to give carte blanche for racial 
preferences.  Public institutions would be vulnerable to the demands of 
special interests.  Benefits would be carved up among competing 
minorities in an ugly game of racial politics.  Powell wanted to allow some 
affirmative action, but also to constrain it, to keep it in check so that race-
consciousness would not become the norm.  He wanted to preserve for the 
future the ideal of a color-blind society. 
Id. 
61  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294.  See also  Justice Powell’s plurality opinion in Wygant v. Jackson 
Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (“The Court has recognized that the level of scrutiny 
does not change merely because the challenged classification operates against a group that 
historically has not been subject to governmental discrimination.”) 
62  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 (“We have held that in ‘order to justify the use of a suspect 
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In addition to recognizing the administrative difficulty inherent in “varying the level of 
judicial review according to a perceived ‘preferred’ status of a particular racial or ethnic 
minority,”63 he noted that identification of members of “majority and ‘minority’ 
necessarily reflect temporary arrangements and political judgments.”64   He concluded 
that the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause are available to “every person 
regardless of his background.”65  
 
There are two themes in Justice Powell’s plurality opinion that serve as the 
underlying basis for his decision to apply the strict scrutiny analysis to evaluate the 
constitutionality of race-based classifications.  He initially recognized the individualized 
nature of the rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause.66  The embodiment of 
Justice Powell’s neutral interpretation of the post-war constitutional amendments was 
forcefully articulated in Bakke: 
                                                 
classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally 
permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is ‘necessary . . . to the 
accomplishment’ of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest.”). 
63  Id. at 295.  
64  Id. at 295.   
By hitching the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause to these transitory 
considerations, we would be holding, as a constitutional principle, that 
judicial scrutiny of classifications touching on racial and ethnic 
background may vary with the ebb and flow of political forces.  Disparate 
constitutional tolerance of such classifications well may serve to 
exacerbate racial and ethnic antagonisms rather than alleviate them. 
[citation omitted] Also, the mutability of a constitutional principle, based 
upon shifting political and social judgments, undermines the chances for 
consistent application of the Constitution from one generation to the next, 
a critical feature of its coherent interpretation. 
Id. at 298-99. 
65  Id. at 299. 
66  But see Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
In my view, government can never have a “compelling interest” in 
discriminating on the basis of race in order to “make up” for past racial 
discrimination in the opposite direction. [citation omitted] Individuals who 
have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should be made 
whole; but under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a 
creditor or a debtor race.  That concept is alien to the Constitution’s focus 
upon the individual, . . . and its rejection of dispositions based on race, . . . 
or based on blood, . . . .  To pursue the concept of racial entitlement - even 
for the most admirable and benign of purposes - is to reinforce and 
preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that produced race 
slavery, race privilege and race hatred.  In the eyes of government, we are 
just one race here.  It is American. 
Id. at 239. 
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If it is the individual who is entitled to judicial protection against classifications 
based upon his racial or ethnic background because such distinctions impinge 
upon personal rights, rather than the individual only because of his membership 
in a particular group, then constitutional standards may be applied consistently. 
 Political judgments regarding the necessity for the particular classification may 
be weighed in the constitutional balance, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 
214 (1944), but the standard of justification will remain constant.67 
 
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s post-Brown interpretation, Justice Powell argued 
that the rights afforded by the Equal Protection Clause are “guaranteed to the individual. 
 The rights established are personal rights.”68  To preserve their meaning, each 
individual, regardless of race or ethnicity, must have an equal opportunity to assert 
these rights and privileges.69  This theme is  consistent in post-Brown decisions.70 
 
Similar themes are also apparent from Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in 
Fullilove.   In Fullilove, Justice Powell applied the strict scrutiny test to evaluate the 
constitutionality of a minority set-aside program.  Pursuant to an amendment to the 
Public Works Employment Act of 1977, the statute required that “at least 10 per 
                    
67  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299. 
68  Id.  See also  Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120-21 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
Indeed, Brown I itself did not need to rely upon any psychological or 
social-science research in order to announce the simple, yet fundamental, 
truth that the government cannot discriminate among its citizens on the 
basis of race. . . . As the Court's unanimous opinion indicated:  "[I]n the 
field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place.  
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." (citation omitted)  
At the heart of this interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause lies the 
principle that the government must treat citizens  as individuals, and not as 
members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups.  It is for this reason that we 
must subject all racial classifications to the strictest of scrutiny, which 
(aside from two decisions rendered in the midst of wartime, [Hirabayashi v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 81(1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 
214(1944)] has proven automatically fatal. 
Id. 
69  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90.  (“The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing 
when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color. 
 If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal”).  
70  See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O’Connor, J., with C.J. 
Rehnquist, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy, dissenting)(“At the heart of the 
Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government 
must treat citizens ‘as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or 
national class’”). 
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centum of the amount of each grant shall be expended for minority business 
enterprises.”71 The Plaintiffs, who were heating and cooling construction contractors, 
filed an Equal Protection action challenging the facial validity of the minority set-aside 
provision.72  The majority upheld the facial validity of the statute by applying a hybrid 
equal protection analysis which was influenced by the Court's deference to 
Congressional decision-making authority.73  The Court described its analytical reasoning 
as a two-step process which focused on  
 
whether the objectives of this legislation are within the power of 
Congress.  If so, we must go on to decide whether the limited use of 
racial and ethnic criteria, in the context presented, is a constitutionally 
permissible means for achieving the congressional objectives and does 
not violate the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment.74 
 
Consistent with his opinion in Bakke, in Fullilove Justice Powell reiterated his 
                    
71  Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 454 (1980). 
72  Id. at 455. 
73  The Supreme Court in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), used a similar 
analysis when evaluating the constitutionality of a FCC program that used racial preferences 
in the assignment of broadcast licenses.  Justice Brennan’s opinion set forth an intermediate 
scrutiny test to evaluate the constitutionality of this race-based preference with added 
deference afforded to the validity of the legislation because of its Congressional origin.  In 
Metro  Broadcasting the Court concluded that: 
benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress – even if those 
measures are not “remedial” in the sense of being designed to compensate 
victims of past governmental or societal discrimination - are 
constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve important 
governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives. 
Id. at 548.  The Supreme Court in Adarand overturned both of these decisions to the extent 
that they were based on the application of an erroneous constitutional standard.  In Adarand, 
the Court held that “all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local 
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.  In other 
words, such classifications are constitutional only is they are narrowly tailored measures that 
further compelling governmental interests.” Adarand, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
74  Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473.  The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]his Court’s approach to 
Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal 
protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 
636, 638, n.2 (1975).  See also  Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448, 496 (Powell, J. concurring) (“The Equal 
Protection Clause, and the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, demand that any governmental distinction among groups must be justifiable.”) 
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commitment to a racially neutral interpretation of the constitution.75  He stressed that 
“[r]acial classifications must be assessed under the most stringent level of review 
because immutable characteristics, which bear no relation to individual merit or need, 
are irrelevant to almost every governmental decision.”76  In this regard, the presumption 
of constitutional invalidity inherent in the use of racial classifications was rebutted by 
the justification of “eradicating the continuing effects of past discrimination identified by 
Congress.”77  Notwithstanding his firm belief in the racial neutrality of the Constitution, 
Justice Powell also acknowledged the necessity for recognition of “narrowly defined 
circumstances”78 to defeat the argument that the strict scrutiny test is “strict in theory, 
but fatal in fact.”79 
 
The second theme apparent from Justice Powell’s plurality opinion in Bakke is 
found in his interpretation of the plain meaning of the language of the Equal Protection 
Clause.80  First, he noted that the meaning of “‘equal protection of the law,’ is 
susceptible of varying interpretations.”81  Citing Justice Holmes,  Powell argues for the 
use of ‘parol evidence’ such as “circumstances and the time”82  to assist in his 
interpretation of this phrase.83  However, defined by words such as “fair, just”84 or 
“equal in status, achievement, or a particular quality,”85 the term equal does not have the 
                    
75  Note that the Adarand decision overruled Fullilove (“Of course, it follows that to the 
extent (if any) that Fullilove held federal racial classifications to be subject to a less rigorous 
standard, it is no longer controlling”) Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235. 
76  Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 496. 
77  Id. at 496.  Although Justice Powell noted that “this Court has never approved race-
conscious remedies absent judicial, administrative, or legislative findings of constitutional or 
statutory violations,” unquestionably Congress “has the authority to identify unlawful 
discriminatory practices, to prohibit those practices, and to prescribe remedies to eradicate 
their continuing effects.”  Id. at 497, 502. 
78  Id. at 496, n. 1. 
79  Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 507. 
80  See also  Hirabayashi v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)(“Distinctions between citizens solely 
because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions 
are founded upon the doctrine of equality. For that reason, legislative classification or 
discrimination based on race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protection.”). 
81  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284 (1978). 
82  Id. at 284. 
83  When interpreting the definition of the word ‘discrimination’ as used in §601 of Title VI, 
Justice Powell cited Justice Holmes’ proposition that “[a] word is not a crystal, transparent 
and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content 
according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.”  Id. at 284.  
84  WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
UNABRIDGED 766 (1986). 
85  WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
UNABRIDGED 767 (1986).  But see the term ‘equality’ as interpreted by Aldous Huxley (1894-
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interpretative elasticity to incorporate group characteristics into its parameters.86  The 
implication is that the equal protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment is neutral 
and “framed in universal terms, without reference to color, ethnic origin, or condition 
of prior servitude.”87  
 
The origin of Justice Powell’s definition of equality can be traced to the natural 
rights philosophy espoused by the framers of America’s most cherished documents.  
The natural rights theorists look to the language of the Declaration of Independence as 
one of the first articulations of this principle.   
 
On July 4, 1776, the Congress unanimously adopted the Declaration 
of Independence drafted by Thomas Jefferson, with a newly 
recognized principle that was to revolutionize the United States in the 
years 1865-68, that ‘all men are created equal,’ and with a solemn 
recognition of the natural rights basis of our fundamental rights.  ‘All 
men,’ wrote Jefferson, ‘are endowed by their Creator with certain 
                                                 
1963), who wrote that “[t]hat all men are equal is a proposition to which, at ordinary times, no 
sane human being has ever given his assent.”  The Idea of Equality, PROPER STUDIES (1927), 
reprinted in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MODERN QUOTATIONS  109 n. 10 (ed. Tony Augarde 
1991). 
86  See Statement by State Representative W.P. Jencks from Clarion and Jefferson Counties to 
the Pennsylvania Legislature on January 23, 1876 urging ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: 
By the first section it is intended to destroy every distinction founded 
upon a difference in the caste, nationality, race or color or persons who 
have been or may be born in and subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States, which had found its way into the laws of the Federal or State 
Governments which regulate the civil relations or rights of the people.  No 
law shall be made or executed which does not secure equal civil rights to 
all.  In all matters of civil legislation and administration there shall be 
perfect legal equality in the advantages and securities guaranteed by each 
State to every one here declared a citizen, without distinction of race or 
color, every one being equally entitled to demand from the States and State 
authorities full security in the enjoyment of such advantages and 
securities. . . . the first section declares the civil rights of the black to be 
equal to those of the white. . . . 
CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 19 
(1981). 
87  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 293.  See Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 
(1943)(“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature 
odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.  For 
that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based on race alone has often been 
held to be a denial of equal protection.”). 
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unalienable Rights, that among them are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit 
of Happiness.’88  
 
Professor Chester J. Antieau argues that “the emphasis upon equality of right 
provided the basis in 1866-68 for the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”89 For example, Professor Antieau cites commentary from the debates 
held  on this matter during the Thirty-Ninth Congress to substantiate this position.  “On 
January 10, 1866, Representative John F. Farnsworth, a Republican from Illinois, told 
the House: ‘When our Fathers, when they framed the Declaration of Independence, 
declared that all men inherited the same rights’ it meant that ‘so far as these natural 
rights were concerned, that one man was equal to any other man.’”90  During the 
debates on the Fourteenth Amendment, Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts 
articulated the normalizing component of the principle of equality.  His definition of 
equality leaves no room for doubt regarding its scope: 
 
These are no vain words.  Within the sphere of their influence no 
person can be created, no person can be born, with civil or political 
privileges not equally enjoyed by all his fellow citizens; nor can any 
institution be established recognizing distinction of birth.  Here is the 
great charter of every human being drawing vital breath upon this soil, 
whatever may be his condition and whoever may be his parents.  He 
may be poor, weak, humble or black; he may be Caucasian, Jewish, 
Indian or Ethiopian race; he may be of French, German, English, or 
Irish extraction; but before the constitution all these distinctions 
                    
88  CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE INTENDED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
70-71 (1997)  
The natural, fundamental rights belonging to citizens by the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were implicitly to be 
equally shared and enjoyed.  Since at least Cicero, it has been understood 
that equality of natural rights is of the essence of a shared humanity.  This 
was well understood by America’s Founding Fathers.  James Wilson ... 
wrote: “The natural rights of man belong equally to all.”  It is clear that the 
Republican leaders in the Thirty-Ninth Congress were committed, by the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, not only to protecting natural, 
fundamental rights, but also to ensure thereby the traditional equality of 
such rights.  The First Section of the Fourteenth Amendment was almost 
entirely (except for the first sentence) the product of Representative John 
Bingham of Ohio.  In 1857 Bingham had assured Congress that the “natural 
or inherent rights which belong to all men irrespective of all constitutional 
regulations, are by the Constitution guaranteed. 
Id. at 243. 
89  Id. at 71. 
90  Id. 
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disappear.  He is not poor, weak, humble or Black; nor is he 
Caucasian, Indian or Ethiopian; nor is he French, German, English or 
Irish.  He is Man, the equal of all his fellow men.  He is one of the 
children of the State, which, like an impartial parent, regards all its 
offsprings with an equal care.  To some it may justly allot higher 
duties according to higher capacities; but it welcomes all in its equal, 
hospitable board.  The State, imitating the Divine justice, is no 
respecter of persons.91 
 
The Supreme Court’s rejection of benign and invidious uses of racial 
classifications is consistent with this narrow definition of ‘equality.’ The Court has 
noted that constitutional equality  mandates neutral application of the rights afforded 
thereunder. Such decisions lead to arbitrary application of constitutional rights which is 
contrary to the basic goal of encouraging certainty through a racially neutral 
interpretation of the constitution.92  Justice O’Connor noted that  
 
[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-
based measures, there is simply no way of determining what 
classifications are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and what classifications are 
in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple 
racial politics.  Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ 
illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is 
pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect 
tool.  The test also ensures that the means chosen ‘fit’ this compelling 
goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for 
the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.93 
 
Similarly, Justice O’Connor has been a consistent supporter of constitutional 
color-blindness.  Her  majority opinion in City of Richmond v. Croson,94 her majority 
opinion in Adarand,95 and her dissent in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC96 reflect this 
                    
91  Id. at 239-40. 
92  See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).  (“These ideas have long 
been central to this Court’s understanding of equal protection, and holding ‘benign’ state 
and federal racial classifications to different standards does not square with them.  ‘[A] free 
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality,’ ibid., should tolerate 
no retreat from the principle that government may treat people differently because of their 
race only for the most compelling reasons.”) 
93  City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). 
94  J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
95  Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227  
The three propositions undermined by Metro Broadcasting all 
derive from the basic principle that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
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philosophy.  For example, Justice O’Connor echoes Justice Powell’s views on the 
individualized nature of the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment in the 
majority opinion she authored in Croson.  Justice O’Connor notes in Croson that “[t]o 
whatever racial group these citizens belong, their ‘personal rights’ to be treated with 
equal dignity and respect are implicated by a rigid rule erecting race as the sole criterion 
in an aspect of public decisionmaking.”97  Subsequently, in her dissent in Metro 
Broadcasting, she rejects the use of group characteristics to determine the applicability 
of constitutional rights and privileges.  She argues that in  
 
the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection lies the simple 
command that the Government must treat citizens ‘as individuals, not 
‘as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class . 
. . .  Social scientists may debate how peoples’ thoughts and behavior 
reflect their background, but the Constitution provides that the 
Government may not allocate benefits and burdens among individuals 
based on the assumption that race or ethnicity determines how they 
act or think.98 
                                                 
to the Constitution protect persons, not groups.  It follows from that 
principle that all governmental action based on race - a group classification 
long recognized as “in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore 
prohibited,” (citation omitted) - should be subjected to detailed judicial 
inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has 
not been infringed. 
Id.  See also Koteles Alexander, Essay, Adarand: Brute Political Force Concealed as a 
Constitutional Colorblind Principle, 39 HOW. L.J. 367, 376 (Fall 1995): 
Justice O’Connor’s attempt in Adarand to advance a colorblind 
notion of the Constitution betrays the Court’s impartiality.  History is 
minimized.  Slavery and segregation are disregarded.  American legal 
history and precedent is dis missed.  The tensions inherent in the political 
process, particularly in the context of race, are forgotten.  By failing to 
consider these fundamental historical facts, a colorblind application of 
equal protection will not promote the venerable idea that all men be treated 
equally before the law, but will perpetuate the status quo.  In other words, 
Justices Powell and O’Connor’s rush to a colorblind principle at this 
juncture in history, accomplishes the same objective that the “all deliberate 
speed” concept was intended to accomplish in Brown II – to keep the 
burden of achieving racial harmony or equality on the victims (political 
minority) and not the perpetrators (political majority). 
Id. 
96  Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting), overruled in part 
by Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
97  See J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493. 
98  Metro Broad. Inc., 497 U.S. at 602. 
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Justice O’Connor’s color-blind interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause 
also reflects the second theme advanced by Justice Powell which focuses on the plain 
meaning of constitutional equality.99  In Croson, she adopted Justice Powell’s argument 
in Bakke that “[t]he guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied 
to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color.”100  
Justice O’Connor reiterated her commitment to race-neutral constitutional equality in 
the dissenting opinion she authored in Metro Broadcasting.  Joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy, Justice O’Connor’s continued 
advocation of a color-blind interpretation of the constitution would not allow the Court 
to abandon strict scrutiny in favor of a lesser standard of review when evaluating race-
based classifications implemented pursuant to Congressional mandate.  She argued that 
  
 
Social scientists may debate how peoples’ thoughts and behavior 
reflect their background, but the Constitution provides that the 
Government may not allocate benefits and burdens among individuals 
based on the assumption that race or ethnicity determines how they 
act or think.  To uphold the challenged programs, the Court departs 
from these fundamental principles and from our traditional 
requirement that racial classifications are permissible only if necessary 
and narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.  This departure 
marks a renewed toleration of racial classifications and a repudiation 
of our recent affirmation that the Constitution’s equal protection 
guarantees extend equally to all citizens.101 
 
When evaluating the justifications for the use of any race-based classifications, 
regardless of whether such classifications disadvantage minority group members or 
members of dominant racial  groups, Justice O’Connor argues that such inquiry must 
be governed by strict scrutiny.102  By refusing to recognize a distinction between 
                    
99  Justice O’Connor’s view of color-blindness extends beyond mere constitutional 
protections.  In her dissenting opinion in Metro Broad. Inc., she writes that “[a]s a Nation we 
aspire to create a society untouched by that history of [racial and ethnic] exclusion, and to 
ensure that equality defines all citizens’ daily experience and opportunities as well as the 
protection afforded to them under law.”  Metro Broad. Inc., 497 U.S. at 611. 
100  J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 494. 
101  Metro Broad. Inc., 497 U.S. at 602 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
102  In his dissent, Justice Marshall argued for a application of a “relaxed” standard of review 
of “race-conscious classifications designed to further remedial goals.”  J.A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S. at 535.  In response, Justice O’Connor noted that  
[e]ven were we to accept a reading of the guarantee of equal 
protection under which the level of scrutiny varies according to the ability 
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benign103 and invidious forms of racial discrimination,104 Justice O’Connor argued that 
                                                 
of different groups to defend their interests in the representative process, 
heightened scrutiny would still be appropriate in the circumstances of this 
case.  One on the central arguments for applying a less exacting standard 
to ‘benign’ racial classifications is that such measures essentially involve a 
choice made by dominant racial groups to disadvantage themselves.  If 
one aspect of the judiciary’s role under the Equal Protection Clause is to 
protect ‘discrete and insular minorities’ from majoritarian prejudice or 
indifference, [citation omitted] ... some maintain that these concerns are not 
implicated when the ‘white majority’ places burdens upon itself. (citation 
omitted) The concern that the political majority will more easily act to the 
disadvantage of a minority based on unwarranted assumptions or 
incomplete facts would seem to militate for, not against, the application of 
heightened judicial scrutiny in this case. 
Id. at 495-96. 
103  In her dissent in Metro Broad. Inc., Justice O’Connor rejects the concept of ‘benign racial 
classifications.’  Metro Broad. Inc., 497 U.S. at 609-10.  She noted that  
‘[b]enign racial classification’ is a contradiction in terms.  Governmental 
dis tinctions among citizens based on race or ethnicity, even in the rare 
circumstances permitted by our cases, exact costs and carry with them 
substantial dangers.  To the person denied an opportunity or right based 
on race, the classification is hardly benign.  The right to equal protection 
of the laws is a personal right, see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22, 68 
S.Ct. 836, 846, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948), securing to each individual an immunity 
from treatment predicated simply on membership in a particular racial or 
ethnic group.  The Court's emphasis on “benign racial classifications” 
suggests confidence in its ability to distinguish good from harmful 
governmental uses of racial criteria.  History should teach greater humility. 
 Untethered to narrowly confined remedial notions, “benign” carries with it 
no independent meaning, but reflects only acceptance of the current 
generation's conclusion that a politically acceptable burden, imposed on 
particular citizens on the basis of race, is reasonable.  The Court provides 
no basis for determining when a racial classification fails to be 
“benevolent.”  By expressly distinguishing “benign” from remedial race- 
conscious measures, the Court leaves the distinct possibility that any 
racial measure found to be substantially related to an important 
governmental objective is also, by definition, “benign.”  Depending on the 
preference of the moment, those racial distinctions might be directed 
expressly or in practice at any racial or ethnic group.  We are a Nation not 
of black and white alone, but one teeming with divergent communities 
knitted together by various traditions and carried forth, above all, by 
individuals.  Upon that basis, we are governed by one Constitution, 
providing a single guarantee of equal protection, one that extends equally 
to all citizens. 
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the constitutional “standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not 
dependent on the race of those burdened or benefitted by a particular classification.”105 
 
In Adarand, Justice O’Connor recognized ‘three general propositions’ that 
serve as the evolutionary framework for the Court’s equal protection paradigm.106  Of 
primary importance to her adoption of a color-blind constitutional interpretation is the 
second proposition which recognizes the Court’s desire for jurisprudential 
consistency107 in its interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.  Justice O’Connor 
argues that constitutional  consistency requires that “‘the standard of review under the 
Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefitted by 
a particular classification,’ [citations omitted] i.e., all racial classifications reviewable 
                                                 
Id. 
104  J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493(“Absent searching judicial inquiry in to the justification 
for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are 
‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of 
racial inferiority or simple racial politics.”) 
105  J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 494. 
106  Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223 (1995).  Skepticism is the first proposition 
identified by Justice O’Connor.  Citing a number of opinions, including Justice Powell’s 
plurality in Wygant, Justice Burger’s opinion and Justice Stewart’s dissent in Fullilove.  This 
proposition is defined as “ ‘[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily 
receive a most searching examination.’”  Id. at 223.  The second proposition, as discussed in 
the text is consistency.  Id.   Finally, the third proposition is congruence which requires the 
Court to conduct the “[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area . . . the same as 
that under the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 224. 
In Adarand, Justice O’Connor noted that the anomalous holding of the Court in 
Metro Broad. Inc., rejected these three general propositions.  This inconsistency between 
Metro Broad. Inc.’s application of an intermediate level of scrutiny to evaluate race-based 
classifications, and the Court’s reliance on the strict scrutiny test serves as the basis for the 
Court’s decision to overrule Metro Broad. Inc.  See id. at 227. 
107  Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229-30. 
The principle of consistency simply means that whenever the government 
treats any person unequally because of his or her race, that person has 
suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit of the 
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection.  It says nothing about the 
ultimate validity of any particular law;  that determination is the job of the 
court applying strict scrutiny.  The principle of consistency explains the 
circumstances in which the injury requiring strict scrutiny occurs.  The 
application of strict scrutiny, in turn, determines whether a compelling 
governmental interest justifies the infliction of that injury. 
Consistency does recognize that any individual suffers an injury 
when he or she is disadvantaged by the government because of his or her 
race, whatever that race may be. 
Id. 
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under the Equal Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized.”108  Ultimately, Justice 
O’Connor recognized the synergistic relationship between the individualized nature of 
constitutional rights and the necessity for removal of racial and ethnic distinctions 
between such individuals in order to enforce those rights using a neutral yardstick. She 
concluded that 
 
The three propositions undermined by Metro Broadcasting all derive 
from the basic principle that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the Constitution protect persons, not groups.  It follows from that 
principle that all governmental action based on race--a group 
classification long recognized as ‘in most circumstances irrelevant and 
therefore prohibited,’ Hirabayashi, [citation omitted]--should be 
subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to 
equal protection of the laws has not been infringed.  These ideas have 
long been central to this Court's understanding of equal protection, 
and holding ‘benign’ state and federal racial classifications to different 
standards does not square with them.  ‘[A] free people whose 
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality,’ [citation 
omitted], should tolerate no retreat from the principle that government 
may treat people differently because of their race only for the most 
compelling reasons.109 
 
The strict scrutiny test -- which requires the Court to find that the racial classification is 
narrowly tailored in furtherance of a compelling state interest -- is the constitutional 
yardstick the Court relies upon to equalize the scope of Fourteenth Amendment 
protections.  Constitutional race neutrality requires that racial classifications trigger 
strict scrutiny notwithstanding their either punitive, beneficial, or remedial impact on a 
particular group. To function as an effective measure of constitutional equality, the 
Court’s race neutral constitutional interpretation removed the vagaries of judicial 
interpretation by incorporating a bright line standard into the equal protection 
paradigm.110    
 
The Supreme Court’s acceptance of a racially neutral interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause has not gone unchallenged.111  The most ardent opponent of 
                    
108  Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224. 
109  Id. at 227. 
110  By eliminating race as a determining factor in the equal protection paradigm the Court, 
however, also disregards any comparative value judgment between unequal treatment 
imposed on majority and minority group members without regard to the historic or social 
antecedents of such conduct.    
111  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 327 (Brennan, J., White, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J., 
concurring)(“claims that law must be ‘colorblind’ or that the datum of race is no longer 
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this philosophy was  Justice Thurgood Marshall whose advocacy of an integrated 
society was tempered by knowledge that continuing vestiges of slavery were operating 
to prevent African Americans from realizing social, political, and economic gains.112  At 
                                                 
relevant to public policy must be seen as aspiration . . . . for reality rebukes us that race has 
too often been used by those who would stigmatize and oppress minorities.”) 
See also  Keith E. Sealing, The Myth of a Color-Blind Constitution, 54 WASH. UNIV. J. OF 
URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW 157, 198-99 (1998). 
If the Constitution is to be viewed as color-blind, as Justices 
Thomas and Scalia and the Podberesky and Hopwood panels would have 
it, the debate ends at that point. A color-blind Constitution would require 
us to solve the problems of a color-conscious society with color-blind 
solutions. Undergraduate and graduate admissions programs would, thus, 
be totally precluded from considering race as a "plus" or otherwise. 
However, the Constitution as drafted and amended by the Bill of Rights, 
and as interpreted by early case law such as the Dredd Scott decision, was 
not a color-blind document. Instead, it saw Eighteenth Century America in 
colors of white, black, red, and yellow, denying citizenship to all but the 
white. Indeed, it protected and guaranteed the institution of slavery into 
the nineteenth century without actually using the term "slave" or "black." 
Despite occasional exceptions, such as Yick Wo v. Hopkins, this 
Constitution gave minorities none of the protections one would expect 
from a color-blind document. 
With the Reconstruction Amendments, Congress had a clear 
opportunity to make the Constitution truly color-blind. Congress could 
have included color-blind language, mandating that "no discrimination 
shall be made on account of race or color."  Such color-blind language was 
presented and debated, but eventually rejected on the grounds of political 
expediency.  Congress instead substituted an ambiguous standard--equal 
protection--that would be continuously debated, but would have the 
immediate advantage of attacking the South's Black Codes without putting 
at risk segregated schools or bans on interracial marriages.  
Progress came in the form of affirmative action programs designed 
to remedy the present effects of discrimination in a wide range of contexts, 
and in a manner that could not be color-blind. 
Id. 
112  Thurgood Marshall contemplating his decision in Bakke. 
The dream of America as the melting pot has not been realized by Negroes 
- either the Negroes did not get into the pot, or he did not get melted down. 
 The statistics on unemployment and other statistics quoted in the briefs ... 
document the vast gulf between White and Black America.  That gulf was 
brought  about by centuries of slavery and then by another century in 
which, with the approval of this Court, states were permitted to treat 
Negroes ‘specially.’ 
PHILLIP J. COOPER, BATTLES ON THE BENCH: CONFLICT INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 16 (1995) 
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no time was the need for judicial intervention into the desperate situation faced by 
African Americans more apparent than in the fight to preserve race-based affirmative 
action programs.  The Bakke case represented the turning point in the Court’s 
utilization of the Equal Protection Clause to remedy impact of years of segregation by 
adopting a color-blind interpretation of the constitution.   
 
Justice Marshall voiced his opposition to the Court’s color-blind interpretation 
of the constitution.  He argued that 
 
If only the principle of color-blindness had been accepted by the 
majority in Plessy in 1896, we would not be faced with this problem 
in 1978.  We must remember, however, that this principle appeared 
only in the dissent.  In the 60 years from Plessy to Brown, ours was a 
Nation where, by law, individuals could be given ‘special’ treatment 
based on race.  For us now to say that the principle of color-blindness 
prevents the University from giving ‘special’ consideration to race 
when this Court, in 1896 licensed the states to continue to consider 
race, is to make a mockery of the principle of ‘equal justice under 
law.’113 
 
In addition to attacking the Court’s disregard for the desperate plight of African 
Americans, Justice Marshall also attacked the notion that ‘equality’ can only be 
achieved by ignoring group characteristics that result in unequal treatment.  Although 
Justice Marshall agreed that group characteristics “were neither significant nor relevant 
to the way in which persons should be treated,”114 he argued that “[w]e are not yet all 
equals, in large part because of the refusal of the Plessy Court to adopt the principle of 
color-blindness.  It would be cruelest irony for this court to adopt the dissent in Plessy 
now and hold that the University must use color-blind admissions.”115  The irony that 
Justice Marshall recognized has its origin in the Court’s incorporation of race neutrality 
into the Equal Protection Clause.  The Equal Protection Clause was specifically adopted 
to provide a constitutional barrier against state action that maintained the denigrated 
status of African Americans following the Civil War.  
 
Justice Marshall’s advocacy of racial inclusion within constitutional decision-
                                                 
(citing Thurgood Marshall, Memorandum to the Conference, April 13, 1978, Brennan Papers, 
Box 465, p. 2-3). 
113  Id.  (citing Thurgood Marshall, Memorandum to the Conference, April 13, 1978, Brennan 
Papers, Box 465, pp.1-2). 
114  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 355 (1978).   
115  PHILLIP J. COOPER, BATTLES ON THE BENCH: CONFLICT INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 17 (1995) 
(citing Thurgood Marshall, Memorandum to the Conference, April 13, 1978, Brennan Papers, 
Box 465 pp. 2-3). 
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making is consistent with his support of remedial affirmative action programs.  He 
noted that 
 
[i]t is because of a legacy of unequal treatment that we now must 
permit the institutions of this society to give consideration to race in 
making decisions about who will hold the positions of influence, 
affluence, and prestige in America.  For far too long, the doors to 
those positions have been shut to Negroes.  If we are ever to become 
a fully integrated society, one in which the color of a person’s skin 
will not determine the opportunities available to him or her, we must 
be willing to take steps to open those doors. I do not believe that 
anyone can truly look into America’s past and still find that a remedy 
for the effects of that past is impermissible.116 
 
A review of current members of the Court reveals that several notable Justices 
have adopted a strict concept of constitutional race neutrality when interpreting the 
protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment.  For example, Justice Clarence 
Thomas stridently opposes the use of racial classifications by state actors.117  He argues 
                    
116  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 401-02. 
117  See Samuel Marcosson, Colorizing the Constitution of Originalism: Clarence Thomas at 
the Rubicon, 16 LAW & INEQ. J. 429, 482 (1998) 
The issues become real when posed to Thomas, an African-American, an 
originalist and a miscegenist.  And we hear those issues differently when 
discussed in his voice.  Hence, a deep irony: the very act of Justice 
Thomas proclaiming the color-blindness ideal demonstrates the flaw in the 
principle, itself.  In his capacity as a Supreme Court Justice, Thomas 
constitutes the ultimate representation of the law he urges must be color-
blind.  Yet, the vastly different voice with which he speaks about the 
Fourteenth Amendment demonstrates conclusively that, at some level, he 
is not blind to color.  I am amazed Thomas can be deaf to the difference 
race produces in his own judicial voice.  Thomas’ color-blindness it 
appears, must be accompanied by an equally potent color-deafness. 
But if we remain oblivious to the difference Clarence Thomas’ 
color makes, we impoverish our understanding of the issue.  In the same 
way, any law professing to be ‘blind’ to the reality of color – Clarence 
Thomas’ law – is also impoverished.  The impoverishment of the law, 
however, is only part of the harm of color-blindness; color-blindness also 
reinforces the foundational premises of assumed white supremacy.  As 
discussed, originalism perpetuates racism by taking race into account in 
the wrong way: it actually reflects and places primary emphasis on the 
Framers’ white supremacist racism.  Though non-originalist, color-
blindness also perpetuates racism but in a different way: by failing to 
account for race a race-conscious society. 
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that 
 
these programs may have been motivated, in part, by good intentions 
cannot provide refuge from the principle that under our Constitution, 
the government may not make distinctions on the basis of race.  As 
far as the Constitution is concerned, it is irrelevant whether a 
government’s racial classifications are drawn by those who wish to 
oppress a race or by those thought to be disadvantaged.  There can be 
no doubt that the paternalism that appears to lie at the heart of this 
program is at war with the principle of inherent equality that underlies 
and infuses our Constitution.118  
 
Justice Scalia is also an advocate of a strict concept of constitutional color-
blindness that presumptively rejects all justifications for the use of race-based 
classifications as illegitimate.  With his characterization of a racially conscious society 
as one which fosters the creation of a “creditor or a debtor race,”119 Justice Scalia 
rejects the argument that there could be any constitutionally compelling justification for 
the use of race-based classifications. Justice Scalia argues that “[i]n my view, 
government can never have a ‘compelling interest’ in discriminating on the basis of race 
in order to ‘make up’ for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction.”120   
                                                 
Id. 
118  Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
119  Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
Individuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination 
should be made whole;  but under our Constitution there can be no such 
thing as either a creditor or a debtor race.  That concept is alien to the 
Constitution's focus upon the individual, see Amdt. 14, §1 ("[N]or shall 
any State ... deny to any person" the equal protection of the laws) 
(emphasis added), and its rejection of dispositions based on race, see 
Amdt. 15, §1 (prohibiting abridgment of the right to vote "on account of 
race"), or based on blood, see Art. III, §3 ("[N]o Attainder of Treason  
shall work Corruption of Blood");  Art. I, §9, cl. 8 ("No Title of Nobility 
shall be granted by the United States").  To pursue the concept of racial 
entitlement--even for the most admirable and benign of purposes--is to 
reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that 
produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred.  In the eyes of 
government, we are just one race here.  It is American. 
Id. 
120  Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).  See also  City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520-21 (1989)(Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgement). 
The difficulty of overcoming the effects of past discrimination is as 
nothing compared with the difficulty of eradicating from our society the 
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III.  REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL INVALIDITY 
 
The color-blind constitutional paradigm requires an initial finding of a 
constitutionally compelling justification for the use of race-based criteria.  Supreme 
Court case law is clear - the goal of remedying present discrimination or the effects of 
past discriminatory practices can serve as a basis for use of race-based 
classifications.121  Proof of broad societal discrimination will not withstand 
constitutional scrutiny.  The discriminatory conduct must have been performed by the 
party implementing the race-based remedy.  Additionally, strict scrutiny mandates that 
the race-based remedy be narrowly tailored to address the harm resulting from such 
past discriminatory conduct. 
 
The origin of this analytical paradigm can be traced to Justice Powell’s plurality 
opinion in Bakke.  In his opinion Justice Powell recognized the racially neutral character 
of the Equal Protection Clause, but also acknowledged that compelling justifications for 
the use of racial classifications may be raised.  After rejecting three of the University’s 
justifications as inconsistent with the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause,122  
                                                 
source of those effects, which is the tendency--fatal to a Nation such as 
ours--to classify and judge men and women on the basis of their country 
of origin or the color of their skin.  A solution to the first problem that 
aggravates the second is no solution at all.  I share the view expressed by 
Alexander Bickel that ‘[t]he lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme 
Court and the lesson of contemporary history have been the same for at 
least a generation: discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, 
unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic society.’ 
Id.; A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975).  At least where state or local action is 
at issue, only a social emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life and limb --for 
example, a prison race riot, requiring temporary segregation of inmates,[citation omitted]--can 
justify an exception to the principle embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment that "[o]ur 
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens," Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)(Harlan, J., dissenting)(citations omitted). 
121  Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986)(O’Connor, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment). (“The Court is in agreement that . . . remedying past or present 
racial discrimination . . . is a sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the remedial use of a 
carefully constructed affirmative action program.”) Pursuant to Justice Powell’s opinion in 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) an unresolved question remains 
regarding the continued permissibility of diversity is a compelling justification for the use of 
race-based criteria. 
122  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305-311.  Justice Powell decisively rejected the University's use of race-
based preferences to reduce "the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in 
medical schools and in the medical profession."   Id. at 306.  He concluded that the 
Constitution prohibits "[p]referring members of any one group for no reason other than race 
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Justice Powell concluded that the University’s use of racial preferences in Bakke was 
justified by its attempt to attain a diverse student body.123  Justice Powell  noted that the 
use of race in this context was “a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of 
higher learning.”124  A majority of Court has not, however, adopted this rationale.125  
 
Justice Powell also addressed a justification for the use of race-based 
classifications that has been more readily accepted by members of the Court.  He 
recognized that racial classifications used as remedial measures may overcome the 
                                                 
or ethnic origin . . ."  Id. at 307.  He also found that the University could not justify its 
program by its efforts to eliminate the effects of societal discrimination.  Justice Powell argued 
that in the absence of "constitutional or statutory violations, it cannot be said that the 
government has any greater interest in helping one individual than in refraining from harming 
another."  Id. at 308-09.  Finally, Justice Powell did not find any correlation between the 
University's race-based admissions program and its goal of increasing the number of 
physicians willing to practice in underserved communities.  Id. at 310. 
123  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.  See discussion regarding the importance of diversity within the 
academic environment, Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15 ("The forth goal asserted by petitioner is the 
attainment of a diverse student body.  This clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an 
institution of higher education.  Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated 
constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment.") 
124  Id. at 311-12.  Note that the university could not satisfy the additional requirement of the 
standard. 
125  See generally Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) 
We agree with the plaintiffs that any consideration of race or ethnicity by 
the law school for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is not a 
compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Justice Powell's 
argument in Bakke garnered only his own vote and has never represented 
the view of a majority of the Court in Bakke or any other case.  Moreover, 
subsequent Supreme Court decisions regarding education state that 
non-remedial state interests will never justify racial classifications.  Finally, 
the classification of persons on the basis of race for the purpose of 
diversity frustrates, rather than facilitates, the goals of equal protection. 
Justice Powell's view in Bakke is not binding precedent on this 
issue.  While he announced the judgment, no other Justice joined in that 
part of the opinion discussing the diversity rationale.  In Bakke, the word 
"diversity" is mentioned nowhere except in Justice Powell's single-Justice 
opinion.  In fact, the four-Justice opinion, which would have upheld the 
special admissions program under intermediate scrutiny, implicitly rejected 
Justice Powell's position. (citations omitted)  Thus, only one Justice 
concluded that race could be used solely for the reason of obtaining a 
heterogenous student body.  As the Adarand Court states, the Bakke 
Court did not express a majority view and is questionable as binding 
precedent. 
Id. 
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presumption of constitutional invalidity associated with the use of race-based 
classifications.126  To serve as constitutionally permissible justification, such use must 
be limited to remedial efforts developed “to redress the wrongs worked by specific 
instances of racial discrimination.”127   Justice Powell noted that “[t]he State certainly 
has a legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating, or eliminating where feasible, the 
disabling effects of identified discrimination.”128  This extremely narrow exception to 
the strict scrutiny analysis is a more widely accepted justification for the use of race-
based classifications than the diversity rationale.129 
 
In Bakke, Justice Powell relied upon this limited exception to the color-blind 
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to reject the University’s argument that 
racial classifications may be used to remedy societal discrimination.130  He cites several 
                    
126  A state actor may overcome the presumption of invalidity by presenting a “strong basis in 
the evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.”  J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 
500 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277). 
127  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.  But see Professor Donald E. Lively, Equal Protection and Moral 
Circumstance: Accounting for Constitutional Basics, 59 FORDHAM L.REV. 485, 518 (1991) 
Current equal protection doctrine actually may be more pernicious 
than the discredited jurisprudence of Plessy.  Unlike that decision, which 
accommodated dominant convention at the expense of minority interests, 
current fourteenth amendment jurisprudence impedes a political majority, 
or collective bargaining process, when it attempts to cure its own past 
wrongs through remedial legislation.  The notion that race presumptively 
cannot be a factor in official action may represent a desirable ideal, but it 
frustrates any constitutional remediation of present inequities.  By making 
race unmentionable, even though its presence and implications are 
pervasive, contemporary equal protection doctrine seriously confounds 
even the most limited aims of the fourteenth amendment. Moreover, equal 
protection jurisprudence not only fails to vindicate, but actually impairs, 
minority interests. 
Id. 
128  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307. 
129  There is one primary distinction between the constitutional color-blindness theorized by 
Justice O’Connor and the doctrine advocated by Justice Powell - the extent to which the 
presumption of constitutional invalidity may be rebutted.  Justice O’Connor rejects the 
argument that diversity can serve as a justification for the use of racial classifications.  She 
supports the use of racial classifications in the limited context of remedying particularized acts 
of past discriminatory conduct.  “Modern equal protection doctrine has recognized only one 
such interest: remedying the effects of racial discrimination.”  Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 
U.S. 547, 612 (1990).  But see Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).  ("In my view, government can never have a 
'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past 
discrimination in the opposite direction.") 
130  The University argued that one goal of its race-based admissions program was to 
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problems associated with efforts to remedy this type of societal injury.  He initially 
notes that a societal remedy would impose a burden on innocent individuals in favor of 
“persons perceived as members of relatively victimized groups.”131  Such a burden, 
Powell argues, cannot be imposed “in the absence of judicial, legislative, or 
administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations.”132  He also places a 
continuing obligation on the judiciary to monitor the remedy to avoid a remedy that is 
both “ageless” in its application  and overly broad in scope.133  “After such findings are 
made, the governmental interest in preferring members of the injured groups at the 
expense of others is substantial, since the legal rights of the victims must be 
vindicated.”134 
 
Justice Powell reiterated this view eight years later in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of 
Educ.,135 finding that racial classifications used to remedy societal discrimination are 
too “amorphous a basis”136 for overcoming the constitutional presumption of 
invalidity.137  He noted in Wygant that  
 
[n]o one doubts that there has been serious racial discrimination in this 
country.  But as the basis for imposing discriminatory legal remedies 
that work against innocent people, societal discrimination is 
insufficient and over expansive.  In the absence of particularized 
                                                 
“counter[ing] the effects of societal discrimination.”  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306. 
131  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307. (“To hold otherwise would be to convert a remedy heretofore 
reserved for violations of legal rights int o a privilege that all institutions throughout the 
Nation could grant at their pleasure to whatever groups are perceived as victims of societal 
discrimination.”) 
132  Id. at 307. 
133  Id.  (“Also, the remedial action usually remains subject to continuing oversight to assure 
that it will work the least harm possible to other innocent persons competing for the benefit.”) 
134  Id. at 307. 
135  Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
136  “[S]ocietal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially 
classified remedy.” Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276.  See also  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (“In the school 
[desegregation] cases, the States were required by court order to redress the wrongs worked 
by specific instances of racial discrimination.  That goal was far more focused than the 
remedying of the effects of ‘societal discrimination,’ an amorphous concept of injury that may 
br ageless in its reach into the past.”) 
137  See also Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Fullilove v. Klutnick  448 U.S. 448 (1980) 
in which he argued that a Congressionally mandated race-based ‘set aside’ program was 
justified by Congressional efforts to remedy past discrimination in the area of public 
contracting.  Notwithstanding the absence of Congressional, administrative or judicial 
findings of past discrimination, Justice Powell concluded that “Government does have a 
legitimate interest in ameliorating the disabling effects of identified discrimination.”  Fullilove, 
448 U.S. at 497 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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findings, a court could uphold remedies that are ageless in their reach 
into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future.138  
 
Although the body of law in this area continues to develop, Supreme Court 
precedent does offer meaningful guidance for the development and implementation of 
voluntary race-based affirmative action programs aimed at remedying specific acts of 
past discrimination.  Although decided on other grounds,139 the Court in Wygant began 
to narrow the parameters of this exception to the general constitutional standard.  The 
Wygant decision resolved a dispute in Jackson, Michigan between the Jackson Board of 
Education and the Jackson Education Association, a teachers union, regarding a 
provision in a collective agreement. The disputed provision which was developed to 
address “racial tension in the community”140 provided that in the event layoffs became 
necessary, the Board of Education would attempt to achieve a situation in which “at no 
time will there be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current 
percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff.”141  Subsequently, 
non-minority teachers, with seniority, who were laid off filed an action alleging among 
other violations, a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.142 
 
Justice Powell authored the plurality opinion in Wygant in which he rejected the 
School Board’s argument that the layoff provision was justified to “remedy prior 
discrimination against minorities by the Jackson School District in hiring teachers.”143  
He concluded, in opposition to a strong dissent authored by Justice  Marshall,144 that in 
the absence of a factual predicate for a finding of past discrimination, such voluntary 
conduct violated the Equal Protection Clause.  Justice Powell concluded that “a public 
employer like the Board must ensure that, before it embarks on an affirmative action 
program, it has convincing evidence that remedial action is warranted.  That is, it must 
have sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that there has been prior 
                    
138  Wygant, 476 U.S. at  276. 
139  In prior litigation, “[b]oth courts concluded that any statistical disparities were the result 
of general societal discrimination, not of prior discrimination by the Board.  The Board now 
contends that, given another opportunity, it could establish the existence of prior 
discrimination. Although this argument seems belated at this point in the proceedings, we 
need not consider the question since we conclude below that the layoff provision was not a 
legally appropriate means of achieving even a compelling purpose.”  Wygant, 476 U.S. at 278. 
140  Id. at 270. 
141  Id. at 270. 
142  Id. at 272. 
143  Id. at 277. 
144  Id. at 295-97.  Justice Marshall, joined in his dissent by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, 
argued that “[t]he record and extra-record materials that we have before us persuasively 
suggest that the plurality has too quickly assumed the absence of a legitimate factual 
predicate, even under the plurality’s own view, for affirmative action in the Jackson schools.” 
 Id. at 297. 
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discrimination.”145 
 
As a result, the plurality’s position was that “the trial court must make a factual 
determination that the employer had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that 
remedial action was necessary.”146  Justice O’Connor, in her concurrence, refined the 
plurality’s test for evaluating the factual predicate for the use of a voluntary affirmative 
action program by noting that the program may be implemented prior to a judicial 
determination of past discrimination.  She noted “that a contemporaneous or antecedent 
finding of past discrimination by a court or other competent body is not a constitutional 
prerequisite to a public employer’s voluntary agreement to an affirmative action 
program.”147  The only prerequisite to the implementation of a voluntary program is that 
“the public actor has a firm basis for believing that remedial action is required.”148  
 
Justice O’Connor argued that there was merit in the factual predicate set forth 
by the School Board for the imposition of the remedial program.  She noted that 
“remedying past or present racial discrimination by a state actor is a sufficiently 
weighty state interest to warrant the remedial use of a carefully constructed affirmative 
action program.”149  The School Board asserted that the purpose underlying the 
remedial program was its “desire to correct apparent prior employment discrimination 
against minorities while avoiding further litigation.”150  Although the Court encourages 
voluntary151 efforts to bring state action into compliance with constitutional and 
                    
145  Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277. 
146  Id. at 277. 
147  Id. at 289  “A violation of federal statutory or constitutional requirements does not arise 
with the making of a finding; it arises when the wrong is committed.  Contemporaneous 
findings serve solely as a means by which it can be made absolutely certain that the 
governmental actor truly is attempting to remedy its own unlawful conduct when it adopts an 
affirmative action plan, rather than attempting to alleviate the wrongs suffered through 
general societal discrimination. (citations omitted) Such findings, when voluntarily made by a 
public employer, obviously are desirable in that they provide evidentiary safeguards of value 
both to nonminority emp loyees and to the public employer itself, should its affirmative action 
program be challenged in court.  If contemporaneous findings were required of public 
employers in every case as a precondition to the constitutional validity of their affirmative 
action efforts, however, the relative value of these evidentiary advantages would diminish, for 
they could be secured only by the sacrifice of other vitally important values.”  Id. at 289-90. 
148  Id. at 286.   
149  Id. 
150  Id. at 287. 
151  See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 364 (1978) (“And our society and 
jurisprudence have always stressed the value of voluntary efforts to further the objectives of 
the law.”); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 290 ("The value of voluntary compliance is doubly important 
when it is a public employer that acts, both because of the example its voluntary assumption 
of responsibility sets and because the remediation of governmental discrimination is of 
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statutory mandates, both the District Court and Court of Appeals “did not make the 
proper inquiry into the legitimacy of the Board’s asserted remedial purpose.”152 
 
The standard articulated by Justice Powell in Bakke for determining the 
constitutionality of a state actor’s ability to implement voluntary race-based affirmative 
programs was later tested by the Court in Croson.  The dispute in Croson originated 
with the implementation of a racial-preference government contracting program by the 
City of Richmond, Virginia.  The program was designed to remedy past discrimination 
in the construction industry “for the purpose of promoting wider participation by 
minority business enterprises in the construction of public projects.”153  The Minority 
Business Utilization Plan (the “Plan”) required general contractors to “subcontract at 
least 30% of the dollar amount of the contract to one or more Minority Business 
Enterprises (MBE’s).”154 
 
This case arose as a result of the City’s rejection of Croson’s bid for the 
“provision and installation of certain plumbing fixtures at the city jail.”155  Although 
Croson attempted at obtain a bid from Continental Metal Hose, a MBE, the MBE’s bid 
was higher than those he obtained from other contractors.  Acceptance of the MBE’s 
bid would have raised the cost of the job by $7,663.16, and the City refused to increase 
the contract price to reflect this cost.  Thereafter, the City refused to issue a waiver of 
the MBE requirement to Croson, and instead rebid the project.  Croson filed an action 
under 42 U.S.C. §1983 challenging the constitutionality of the Plan “on its face and as 
applied in this case.”156 
 
The procedural history of this case reveals opposing schools of thought 
regarding the sufficiency of the City’s justifications for its race-based remedial Plan.  
The District Court’s conclusion was in accord with the City’s position that “national 
findings of discrimination in the construction industry, when considered in conjunction 
with the statistical study concerning the awarding of prime contracts was due to past 
discrimination ‘reasonable.’”157  The District Court, relying on the deferential standard 
of review of Congressional decision-making established by the Court in Fullilove, 
upheld the validity of the Plan.  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower 
court’s decision.  The justifications articulated by the City were viewed as ‘reasonable’ 
by both courts. 
                                                 
unique importance."). 
152  Wygant, 476 U.S. at 293. 
153  City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 478 (1989). 
154  Id. at 477. 
155  Id. at 481. 
156  Id. at 483. 
157  Id. at 484 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 779 F.2d 181, 190 and n.12 (4th Cir. 
1985) [hereinafter Croson I]). 
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A subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court, together with the Court’s 
intervening decision in Wygant established the basis for an opposing resolution of this 
case.  The Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s decision, and remanded the case 
for further consideration.  Upon a second review, the Fourth Circuit closely scrutinized 
the City’s justifications in accordance with the Wygant decision, and ultimately found 
that the justifications could not withstand constitutional scrutiny.  On remand, the 
Fourth Circuit concluded that voluntary race-based programs implemented to remedy 
societal discrimination cannot be justified by “broad-brush assumptions of historical 
discrimination.”158  Instead, the City was required to demonstrate “prior discrimination 
by the government unit involved.”159     
 
As a threshold matter, the Court concluded that the strict scrutiny test was the 
appropriate evaluative tool for determining the constitutionality of the Plan, 
notwithstanding its remedial purpose.160  In accordance with the rationale of Bakke, 
Justice O’Connor’s initial inquiry focused on whether the City engaged in “judicial, 
legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations”161 that 
would warrant  implementation of constitutionally permissible measures to remedy past 
discriminatory conduct.  “Only then does the government have a compelling interest in 
favoring one race over another.”162   
 
The Court then engaged in a comprehensive analysis of each specific 
justification raised by the City.163  To support its  primary justification for the Plan, the 
                    
158  Id. at 485 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 882 F.2d 1355, 1357 (4th Cir. 1987) 
[hereinafter Croson II]). 
159  J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 485. (“In this case, the debate at the city council meeting 
‘revealed no record of prior discrimination by the by the city in awarding public contracts . . . . 
 Moreover, the statistics comparing the minority population of Richmond to the percentage of 
prime contracts awarded to minority firms had little or no probative value in establishing prior 
discrimination in the relevant market, and actually suggested ‘more of a political than a 
remedial basis for the racial preference. (citations omitted)”). 
160  J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493.  “Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ 
illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important 
enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.  The test also ensures that the means chosen 
‘fit’ this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the 
classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.”  Id. 
161  J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 497. 
162  Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. V. Bakke, 435 U.S. 265, 308-09 (1978).  
163  “The District Court relied upon five predicate ‘facts’ in reaching its conclusion that there 
was an adequate basis for the 30% quota: (1) the ordinance declares itself to be remedial; (2) 
several proponents of the measure stated their views that there had been past discrimination 
in the construction industry; (3) minority businesses received 0.67% of prime contracts form 
the city’s population; (4) there were very few minority contractors in local and state 
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City argued that “there was racial discrimination in the construction industry ‘in this 
area, and the State, and around the nation.’”164  Justice O’Connor articulated an 
evaluative standard for assessing the underlying purpose of a voluntary affirmative 
action plan.  She stressed that 
 
[t]he factfinding process of legislative bodies is generally entitled to a 
presumption of regularity and deferential review by the judiciary. 
(Citation omitted) But when a legislative body chooses to employ a 
suspect classification, it cannot rest upon a generalized assertion as to 
the classification’s relevance to its goals. (Citation omitted) A 
governmental actor cannot render race a legitimate proxy for a 
particular condition merely by declaring that the condition exists. 
(Citation omitted) The history of racial classifications in this country 
suggests that blind judicial deference to legislative or executive 
pronouncements of necessity has no place in equal protection 
analysis. (Citation omitted).165  
 
The Court noted that statements of discrimination “are of little probative value in 
establishing identified discrimination in the Ric hmond construction industry.”166  In 
Croson, the underlying purpose of this Plan was not, however, evidenced by 
particularized past discriminatory conduct sufficient enough to withstand constitutional 
scrutiny.   
 
The City also relied on statistical disparities between the number of minorities 
within the construction industry and the population of Richmond to justify its race-
based preference program.  It supported this justification with the Supreme Court’s 
recognition that appropriate statistical evidence may be indicative of discriminatory 
conduct.167  “In the employment context, we have recognized that for certain entry 
level positions requiring minimal training, statistical comparisons of the racial 
composition of an employer’s work force to the racial composition of the relevant 
population may be probative of a pattern of discrimination.”168  There is, however, an 
                                                 
contractors’ associations; and (5) in 1977, Congress made a determination that the effects of 
past discrimination had stifled minority participation in the construction industry nationally.” 
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 499. 
164  Id. at 500. 
165  Id. at 500-01. 
166  Id. at 500. 
167  See Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public Schools, 19 F. Supp.2d 449, 454 (1998) 
(“Likewise, extremely low percentages of minorities, or non-minorities, in certain public 
schools might raise an inference of discrimination.” (Citing Swann v. Mecklenberg Bd. Of Ed., 
402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971)). 
168  J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 501. 
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exception to this rule.169  Where “special qualifications are necessary, the relevant 
statistical pool for purposes of demonstrating discriminatory exclusion must be the 
number of minorities qualified to undertake the particular task.”170  This exception 
proved fatal to the City’s ability to justify its remedial program.   The Court identified 
several deficiencies in the City’s analysis.  It noted that the City “does not even know 
how many MBE’s in the relevant market are qualified to undertake prime or 
subcontracting work in public construction projects. ... Nor does the city know what 
percentage of total city construction dollars minority firms now receive as 
subcontractors on prime contracts let by the city.”171 
 
The Court also noted the lack of evidentiary support for the City’s assertion 
that the remedial program was necessary because  “white prime contractors simply will 
not hire minority firms.”172  The Court’s response was simply that “[w]ithout any 
information on minority participation in subcontracting, it is quite simply impossible to 
evaluate overall minority representation in the city’s construction expenditures.”173  The 
absence of evidentiary support was also apparent in the City’s assertion that “MBE 
membership in local contractors’ associations was extremely low.”174  The City failed 
to correlate these membership statistics with a pattern of racially discriminatory 
conduct by the City or any participant in Richmond’s construction industry.   
 
For low minority membership in these associations to be relevant, the 
city would have to link it to number of local MBE’s eligible for 
membership.  If the statistical disparity between eligible MBE’s and 
MBE membership were great enough, an inference of discriminatory 
exclusion could arise.  In such case, the city would have a compelling 
interest in preventing its tax dollars from assisting these organizations 
in maintaining a racially segregated construction market.175 
 
The final justification for Richmond’s remedial plan was summarily dismissed 
by the Court.  The Court stated that the “probative value” of the City’s assertion that 
                    
169  J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 501.  (“There is no doubt that ‘[w]here gross statistical 
disparities can be shown, they alone in a proper case may constitute prima facie proof of a 
pattern or practice of discrimination’ under Title VII. (Citation omitted) But it is equally clear 
that ‘[w]hen special qualifications are required to fill particular jobs, comparisons  to the 
general population (rather than to the smaller group of individuals who possess the 
necessary qualifications) may have little probative value.”) 
170  J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 501-02. 
171  Id. at 502. 
172  Id. 
173  Id. at 502-03. 
174  Id. at 503. 
175  Id. 
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“there had been nationwide discrimination in the construction industry was extremely 
limited.”176  Justice O’Connor in Croson concluded that “[w]hile the States and their 
subdivisions may take remedial action when they possess evidence that their own 
spending practices are exacerbating a pattern of prior discrimination, public or private, 
with some specificity before they may use race-conscious relief.”177  In addition to not 
being narrowly tailored,178 the Court held that  
 
none of the evidence presented by the city points to any identified 
discrimination in the Richmond construction industry.  We, therefore, 
hold that the city has failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in 
apportioning public contracting opportunities on the basis of race.  To 
accept Richmond’s claim that past societal discrimination alone can 
serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the 
door to competing claims for ‘remedial relief’ for every disadvantaged 
group.  The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where 
race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be 
lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently 
unmeasurable claims of past wrongs.  ‘Courts would be asked to 
evaluate the extent of the prejudice and consequent harm suffered by 
various minority groups.  Those whose societal injury is thought to 
exceed some arbitrary level of tolerability then would be entitled to 
preferential classifications ....’ (Citation omitted)  We think such a 
result would be contrary to both the letter and spirit of a constitutional 
provision whose central command is equality.179 
 
The Court’s willingness to recognize that remedying specific acts of past 
discrimination can serve as a constitutionally compelling justification for the use of 
race-based classifications was also addressed in Adarand.  This case represents the 
culmination of 17 years of Supreme Court litigation on this issue.  The judgment issue 
by the Court in this case represents one of few unified pronouncements from the Court 
on the standard of review required to evaluate equal protection challenges to race-based 
affirmative action programs. 
 
In Adarand, the plaintiff submitted the lowest bid to supply guardrails on a 
federal highway construction project.  The contract was instead awarded to a Hispanic 
contractor who was certified by the Small Business Administration as “socially and 
economically disadvantaged.”180  The subcontractor’s certification made the prime 
                    
176  J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 504. 
177  Id. 
178  Id. at 507-08. 
179  Id. at 505-06. 
180  Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 205 (1995). 
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contractor eligible for a financial incentive program available only to general contractors 
who hired companies controlled by disadvantaged individuals.  The equal protection 
challenge to the government’s financial incentive program raised by the plaintiff was 
defeated on a motion for summary judgment.  The Court of Appeals, relying on the 
lenient standard of review for federal race-based preferences established by the Court in 
Metro Broadcasting and Fullilove, affirmed the District Court’s decision.181   
 
On appeal, the Supreme Court finally reached a consensus regarding the 
standard of review appropriate for assessing the constitutionality of federally mandated 
racial classifications.  Justice O’Connor initially rejected any language set forth in Metro 
Broadcasting or Fullilove that suggested that an intermediate level of scrutiny is the 
appropriate standard of review for evaluating the constitutionality of governmental racial 
classifications. The Adarand decision also broadened the holding in Croson by making 
strict scrutiny analysis applicable to classifications used by federal government 
actors.182   In this regard, the Court held that “all racial classifications, imposed by 
whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing 
court under strict scrutiny.  In other words, such classifications are constitutional only 
if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental 
interests.”183 
 
The Court further noted that the standard of review for equal protection claims 
was not dependent upon the identity of the governmental decision-maker.  Specifically, 
the Court resolved the question that arose after Fullilove regarding whether the Court 
should afford judicial deference when reviewing the constitutionality of Congressionally 
mandated racial classifications.  Justice O’Connor clarified the Court’s position by 
concluding that “to the extent (if any) that Fullilove held federal racial classifications to 
be subject to a less rigorous standard, it is no longer controlling.”184  
 
The Court was also challenged to articulate circumstances in which it would 
                    
181  Id. at 210.   
182  Id. at 222. 
With Croson, the Court finally agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires strict scrutiny of all race-based action by state and local 
governments.  But Croson of course had no occasion to declare what 
standard of review the Fifth Amendment requires for such action taken by 
the Federal Government.  Croson observed simply that the Court’s 
‘treatment of an exercise of congressional power in Fullilove cannot be 
dispositive here,’ because Croson’s facts did not implicate Congress’ 
broad power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Id. 
183  Id. at 227. 
184  Id. at 235. 
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find a compelling justification for the use of race-based classification capable of falling 
within the exception to the concept of constitutional color-blindness that had permeated 
the Court’s post-Bakke decisions on affirmative action.  Justice O’Connor specifically 
responded to the complaint raised by Justice Marshall in Fullilove that “strict scrutiny 
is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’”185  Although a strong advocate of constitutional 
color-blindness, Justice O’Connor acknowledged that race neutrality has not fully 
integrated itself into the social fabric of American society.  She  noted that “[t]he 
unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial 
discrimination against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and 
government is not disqualified from acting in response to it.”186   
 
Unfortunately, the Court did not have an opportunity to fully address this issue 
in light of the lower courts’ failure to apply a heightened standard of proof to evaluate 
the constitutionality of the race-based components of the SBA’s government 
contracting program.187  As a result of its decision to overrule Metro Broadcasting and 
Fullilove, Justice O’Connor remanded Adarand to the District Court for a 
determination of whether the government’s use of racial classifications was justified by 
a compelling interest and narrowly tailored to achieve the goals articulated by the 
program in accordance with the strict scrutiny analysis.188 
                    
185  Id. at 237 (quoting Fulllove v. Klutznick , 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980), overruled by Adarand 
Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, (1995) (Marshall J., concurring)). 
186  Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237. 
187  Id. at 237. 
Because our decision today alters the playing field in some important 
respects, we think it best to remand the case to the lower courts for further 
consideration in light of the principles we have announced.  The Court of 
Appeals, following Metro Broadcasting and Fullilove, analyzed the case 
in terms of intermediate scrutiny.  It upheld the challenged statutes and 
regulations because it found them to be 'narrowly tailored to achieve [their] 
significant governmental purpose of providing subcontracting 
opportunities for small disadvantaged business enterprises.' 16 F.3d, at 
1547 (emphasis added).  The Court of Appeals did not decide the question 
whether the interests served by the use of subcontractor compensation 
clauses are properly described as 'compelling.'  It also did not address the 
question of narrow tailoring in terms of our strict scrutiny cases, by asking, 
for example, whether there was 'any consideration of the use of 
race-neutral means to increase minority business participation' in 
government contracting, Croson, supra , at 507, 109 S.Ct., at 729, or 
whether the program was appropriately limited such that it 'will not last 
longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed to eliminate,' Fullilove, 
supra , at 513, 100 S.Ct., at 2792-2793 (Powell, J., concurring). 
188  On remand, the District Court in Adarand concluded that although findings of past 
discrimination in the federal construction contracting industry served as a compelling 
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IV.   CONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS 
 
Although few would argue that race discrimination or even the vestiges of past 
de jure discrimination have been eliminated from the American framework, the ability to 
substantiate such claims is increasingly difficult.  We no longer live under a system of 
Jim Crow laws that clearly identify the players.  In the absence of the proverbial 
smoking gun, the Court’s color-blind interpretation of the equal protection paradigm 
serves as substantial barrier to the continued implementation of race-based remedial 
affirmative action programs.  However, there are several ways to defeat the argument 
that strict scrutiny is “strict in theory, fatal in fact.”  
 
The first option available to race-based affirmative action proponents has little 
pragmatic appeal.  Using a strategy reminiscent of the one utilized by the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund during the 1940's to end school desegregation, public institutions of 
higher education could be encouraged to implement race-based remedial affirmative 
action programs in response to litigation challenging the validity of their existing 
admissions programs.189  Similar legal challenges in the area of municipal hiring have 
                                                 
justification for Congressional implementation of race-based set-asides, the program was not 
narrowly tailored enough to overcome the strict scrutiny analysis.   
I conclude that the statutes and regulations implicated in the SCC program, 
with respect to the races included as presumptively disadvantaged, do not 
provide a reasonable assurance that the application of racial criteria will be 
limited to accomplishing the remedial objectives of Congress.... As such, 
they are not narrowly tailored to serve the interest of eliminating 
discrimination in the construction industry. 
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 965 F.Supp. 1556, 1581 (1997).  This decision was, however, 
vacated with directions to dismiss by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 169 F.3d 1292, 1299 
(1999). 
189  See generally, Motion to Intervene filed on behalf of minority students and affirmative 
action proponents in the cases filed by Gratz and Grutter against the University of Michigan.  
Although the District Court denied their motions to intervene in the cases brought by Gratz 
and Grutter challenging the race-based admissions programs utilized by the University's 
College of Literature and Law School, the Sixth Circuit issued an opinion in which it 
consolidated these cases for the purpose of reversing the District Court's decision, and 
allowing the minority defendants to intervene in the action. The Sixth Circuit concluded that 
the intervention would permit the introduction of "evidence of past discrimination by the 
University itself or of the disparate impact of some current admissions criteria, and that these 
may be important and relevant factors in determining the legality of a race-conscious 
admissions policy." Grutter v. Bollinger 188 F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 1999).  See also  action filed 
by civil rights groups on behalf of African American, Hispanic and Filipino students against 
the University of California at Berkeley on Feb. 2, 1999.  The suit alleges that Berkeley's 
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resulted in voluntary race-based affirmative action programs sanctioned by the courts 
through consent decrees.190  Unfortunately, the ineffic iency of this strategy is readily 
apparent. In addition to being costly and time consuming, educational institutions are 
well aware of the judicial and statutory prohibitions on racially discriminatory practices. 
 The least of which is Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,191 which if violated may 
result in the elimination of much needed federal funding.  In this regard, even if 
evidence of past discrimination existed, prudent educational institutions would be 
compelled to challenge every attempt at making such an admission in order to avoid 
liability. 
 
As a result, the only remaining avenue for relief is to seek Congressional 
intervention and implementation of race-based remedial action for instances of 
discrimination and to eradicate the continuing effects past discrimination in both the 
public and private sectors of higher education.192  The Court has previously recognized 
                                                 
admissions policies violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and have an unjustified 
disparate impact on minority applicants.  Seth Rosenfeld, UC-Berkeley sued over minority 
admissions, San Francisco Examiner, February 3,1999, at A7; Sara Hebel, Bias in admissions 
charged at Berkeley, Chron. Of Higher Educ., February 12, 1999, at A37. 
190  See generally, Local No. 93, Intern. Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIOC.L.C. v. City of 
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); Boston Police Superior Officers Federation v. City of Boston, 
147 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 1998); McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219 (7th Cir. 1998); United 
States v. City of Miami, 115 F.3d 870 (11th Cir. 1997). 
191  The provisions of Title VI are not all punitive.  The regulations issued by the Department 
of Education governing the administration of Title VI provide that educational institutions 
may voluntarily implement affirmative action programs to either "overcome the effects of prior 
discrimination" due to "race, color, or national origin."  “Even in the absence of past 
discrimination, Title VI provides that educational institutions may implement voluntary 
measures aimed at overcoming the effects of conditions which resulted in limiting 
participation by persons of a particular race, color, or national origin."  34 CFR §100.3(b)(6)(i)-
(iii) (1990). 
192  For a discussion of justifications for government mandated affirmative action program 
designed to address private discrimination in the area of government contracting, see Ian 
Ayres and Fredrick E. Vars, When Does Private Discrimination Justify Public Affirmative 
Action?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1577 (November, 1998).  See also CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., NOT 
ALL BLACK AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, RACE, AND AMERICAN VALUES 177 (1996). 
A government-imposed preference might be thought more acceptable on 
the theory that, if the justification for a preference embodies important 
principles and aspirations, then government should lead; that regulating 
abuses is not enough.  Moreover, the aspiration of inclusion . . . has most 
weight as regards public institutions where it is seen to be democratic and 
to promote civic community.  On the other hand, given that preferences 
have a moral cost, some will argue that the moral injury is more grievous if 
inflicted by one's own government - by the power of the state.  This latter 
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that race-based affirmative action programs implemented by State governments may 
withstand constitutional scrutiny if they are designed to remedy past discrimination or 
the present effects of specific acts of past discrimination.193  If narrowly tailored, such 
                                                 
view is currently the law, because the constitutional scrutiny of 
government affirmative action is tougher than say, Title VII scrutiny of 
private employer efforts.  This approach honors private autonomy, but 
also signals some moral ambivalence, making racial preferences wrong for 
one actor but acceptable for another - wrong when people act collectively 
through government, but acceptable when they act personally. ... This is 
unsatisfying.  Surely if the state stands idly by while my neighbor injures 
me, I have strong grounds for complaint.  The private-public distinction 
does not and cannot definitely resole the issue of our responsibilities to 
one another.  What works, in my view, is to engage in the moral 
conversation about what those responsibilities are; then, having decided, 
ask what enforcement mechanisms are appropriate in light of a variety of 
considerations - practicality, ethics, custom.  It may be that we decide to 
leave enforcement to social norms and informal community standards of 
civility, or to religious or other community institutions.  Or we may decided 
that the state should be involved in a regulatory capacity.  In race as in 
smoking, obscenity, abortion and elsewhere: we should not make the 
typical lawyer's error of confusing the question of what is right with the 
decision about the role of government. 
Id.  For an alternative avenue of redress which relies on the intervention of the Executive 
Branch of government, see, How President Clinton Could Advance the Higher Educational 
Opportunities of Black Americans, 16 JOURNAL OF BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC. 50 (1997). 
If president Clinton is serious about retaining affirmative action in, as he 
says, a 'repaired' form, he has it within his powers to form a commission of 
highly respected citizens and legal advocates to make the most powerful 
possible case before the Supreme Court for the constitutionality of 
affirmative action procedures.  Properly armed with facts and hard 
sociological data on the favorable impact of affirmative action on American 
society, these experts will make a compelling brief for the proposition that 
affirmative action is in the public interest. 
President Clinton could also instruct the Justice Department to 
use its huge legal resources to enter, on the side of black people and other 
racial minorities, every pending case raising the issue of the 
constitutionality of racial preferences. 
Id. 
193  Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 291 (1986) (O’Connoe J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment). 
Indeed, our recognition of the responsible state actor’s  competency to 
take these steps is assumed in our recognition of the States’ constitutional 
duty to take affirmative steps to eliminate the continuing effects of past 
unconstitutional discrimination. 
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programs may rebut the presumption of constitutional infirmity inherent in the use of 
such an invidious classification as race.  Although the Court has eliminated race from 
the equal protection paradigm, the Court is not foreclosed from utilizing race-based 
remedial measures to counter the effects of past discriminatory practices.194 
 
A.  Congressional Remedial Authority 
 
A threshold question that must be resolved prior to the implementation of any 
Congressionally mandated race-based remedial affirmative action programs is whether 
the Constitution authorizes Congress to engage in efforts to ameliorate discriminatory 
practices in the private as well as the public sector of higher education.  Although 
judicial inquiry into the extent of Congress' remedial powers is not novel, the issue 
remains unresolved by the Court.  Questions regarding the extent of Congressional 
remedial powers were raised almost twenty years ago in Fullilove.  In Fullilove the 
Court addressed the extent of Congressional authority to impose remedial measures 
designed to eliminate racial discrimination in federal contracting and procurement 
programs.195  In the plurality opinion, Justice Burger concluded that  
 
[i]t is fundamental that in no organ of government, state or federal, 
does there repose a more comprehensive remedial power than in 
Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution with competence and 
authority to enforce equal protection guarantees.  Congress not only 
may induce voluntary action to assure compliance with existing 
federal statutory or constitutional antidiscrimination provisions, but 
also, where Congress has authority to declare certain conduct 
unlawful, it may, as here, authorize and induce state action to avoid 
such conduct.196 
                                                 
Id. 
194 Fulllove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 482 (1980), overruled by Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 
515 U.S. 200, (1995) (Marshall J., concurring)).  (“[W]e reject the contention that in the 
remedial context the Congress must act in a wholly ‘color-blind’ fashion” (quoting Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 402 U.S. 1, 18-21, 91 S. Ct. R67 (1971)).  See also, 
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280-81.  We have recognized, however, that in order to remedy the effects 
of prior discrimination, it may be necessary to take race into account.  As part of this Nation’s 
dedication to eradicating racial discrimination, innocent persons may be called upon to bear 
some of the burden of the remedy.  
195  Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 459.  The stated objective of the minority set aside program at issue 
in Fullilove was “to direct funds into the minority business community, a sector of the 
economy sorely in need of economic stimulus but which, on the basis of past experience with 
Government procurement programs, could not be expected to benefit significantly from the 
public works program as then formulated.”  Id. 
196  Id. at 483-84. 
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Although the Adarand decision overturned Fullilove due to the Court’s failure 
in Fullilove to apply strict scrutiny to evaluate the constitutionality of the minority set-
aside program at issue in the case, the Court has never repudiated Justice Burger’s 
interpretation of Congress’s remedial authority in this area.197  For example, Justice 
O’Connor echoed this Constitutional philosophy in Croson.  She noted that  
 
Congress, unlike any State or political subdivision, has a specific 
constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The power to ‘enforce’ may at times also include the 
power to define situations which Congress determines threaten 
principles of equality and to adopt prophylactic rules to deal with 
those situations.198   
 
The origin of the Congressional authority referred to by Justices Burger and 
O’Connor is found in §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment which gives Congress the 
power to enforce its provisions "by appropriate legislation."199  Justice Powell, in 
discussing the legislative history of the post-Civil War Amendments, noted specifically 
that “the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment may have contemplated that Congress, 
rather than the federal courts, would be the prime force behind enforcement of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”  To date, the Court has not articulated the scope of this 
power,200 but it is clear that such Congressional power is reviewable by the judiciary, 
                    
197  Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995). 
Of course, it follows that to the extent (if any) that Fullilove held federal 
racial classifications to be subject to a less rigorous standard, it is no 
longer controlling.  But we need not decide tody whether the program 
upheld in Fullilove would survive strict scrutiny as our more recent cases 
have defined it. 
Id. 
198  City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 478 (1989). 
199 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966). 
Thus the . . . standard is the measure of what constitutes 'appropriate 
legislation' under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Correctly viewed, §5 
is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its 
discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure 
the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Id. 
200  Adarand, 515 U.S. at 230. 
It is true that various Members of this Court have taken different views of 
the authority S 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment confers upon Congress to 
deal with the problem of racial discrimination, and the extent to which 
courts should defer to Congress' exercise of that authority. [citation 
omitted] We need not, and do not, address these differences today.  For 
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and as such must conform to the mandates of the Court’s interpretation of the equal 
protection paradigm.201  Notwithstanding lingering questions about the scope of 
Congressional remedial power, one fact is clear.  Any governmental use of racial 
classifications, whether utilized by city, state, federal, or Congressional authority, must 
comply with the strict scrutiny analysis.  As the Court in Adarand held, the equal 
protection paradigm requires that “such classifications are constitutional only if they are 
narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.”202 
 
Justice O'Connor's willingness to apply strict scrutiny with equal force to 
remedial legislation promulgated by state or  federal actors has been severely criticized.  
In his dissenting opinion in Adarand, Justice Stevens argues that such application 
ignores the "practical and legal differences between federal and state or local 
decisionmakers."203  He argues that §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers the 
federal government to enact legislation aimed at eliminating "historic racial 
subjugation."204  As such, judicial deference must be expended to the exercise of the 
federal decision-making authorized in furtherance of this mandate.  He argued that such 
deference is a necessary weapon in the fight  to eliminate racial discrimination: 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment directly empowers Congress at the same 
time it expressly limits the States.  This is no accident.  It represents 
our Nation's consensus, achieved after hard experience throughout 
our sorry history of race relations, that the Federal Government must 
be the primary defender of racial minorities against the States, some 
of which may be inclined to oppress such minorities.  A rule of 
'congruence' that ignores a purposeful 'incongruity' so fundamental to 
                                                 
now, it is enough to observe that Justice Stevens' suggestion that any 
Member of this Court has repudiated in this case his or her previously 
expressed views on the subject, post at 2123-2125, 2127, is incorrect. 
Id. 
201  See Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 509. 
202  Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. 
203  Id. at 249 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
An additional reason for giving greater deference to the National 
Legislature than to a local law-making bady is that federal affirmative-
action programs represent the will of our entire Nation's elected 
representatives, whereas a state or local program may have an impact on 
nonresident entities who played no part in the decision to enact it.  Thus, 
in the state or local context, individuals who were unable to vote for the 
local representatives who enacted a race-conscious program may 
nonetheless fell the effects of that program. 
Id. at 252. 
204  Id. at 252. 
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our system of government is unacceptable.205 
 
One proposition which served as the basis for Justice O'Connor's decision in 
Adarand to apply strict scrutiny to evaluate the use of racial classifications by federal 
actors focused on the need for congruence between the equal protection analysis 
required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.206  Justice Stevens, however, 
argued that Justice O'Connor's rule of congruence ignores the fundamental distinction 
between the broad national decision-making authority of the federal government, and 
the limited scope of state legislatures to the detriment of programs aimed at furthering 
the goals of the Fourteenth Amendment.207  Justice O'Connor countered this argument 
by noting that the principles of equality are furthered by applying the same exacting 
standard of review, notwithstanding the branch of government serving as the decision-
maker.208   
                    
205  Id. at 255. 
206  See Justice O'Connor discussion regarding congruence in Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224. 
207  Justice Stevens, dissent, Adarand, 515 U.S. at 253.  Id. at 253 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Presumably, the majority is now satisfied that its theory of 'congruence' 
between the substantive rights provided by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments disposes of the objection based upon divided constitutional 
powers.  But it is one thing to say (as no one seems to dispute) that the 
Fifth Amendment encompasses a general guarantee of equal protection as 
broad as that contained within the Fourteenth Amendment.  It is another 
thing entirely to say that Congress' institutional competence and 
constitutional authority entitles it to no greater deference when it enacts a 
program designed to foster equality than the deference due to a State 
legislature. 
Id. 
208  Id. at 230-31 (O’Connor, J.). 
Justice Stevens also claims that we have ignored any difference between 
federal and state legislatures.  But requiring that Congress, like the States, 
enact racial classifications only when doing so is necessary to further a 
'compelling interest' does not contravene any principle of appropriate 
respect for a coequal branch of the Government.  It is true that various 
Members of this Court have taken different views of the authority §5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment confers upon Congress to deal with the problem 
of racial discrimination, and the extent to which courts should defer to 
Congress' exercise of that authority.  See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. 
FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 605-06 (1975) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.469, 486-93 ( O'Connor, J., 
Rehnquist, C.J., and White, J.) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Fullilove v. 
Klutznick,, 448 U.S. 448, 472-73 (1980) ( Burger, C.J.) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(Stewart, J., dissenting).  We need not, and do not, address these 
differences today.  For now, it is enough to observe that Justice Stevens' 
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Notwithstanding this criticism, the Court has, however, acknowledged that 
Congressional legislative power is broader than that which may be exercised by state 
and local governments.  Justice O’Connor recognized this distinction in Croson, when 
she noted that “Congress may identify and redress the effects of society-wide 
discrimination does not mean that, a fortiori, the States and their political subdivisions 
are free to decide that such remedies are appropriate.”209  The scope of Congressional 
power has clearly been distinguished from that held by other political entities.  In 
Bakke, the Court noted that the University’s “broad mission is education, not the 
formulation of any legislative policy or the adjudication of particular claims of 
illegality.”210  This lack of national legislative authority prevented the University from 
implementing remedial affirmative action measures designed to address societal 
discrimination.211  Congress, on the other hand, is not only authorized, but expected to 
fulfill the mandated of the Fourteenth Amendment by addressing discrimination on a 
national scope.  In Bakke, Justice Powell concluded that “[b]efore relying upon these 
sorts of findings in establishing a racial classification, a governmental body must have 
the authority and capability to establish, in the record, that the classification is 
responsive to identified discrimination.”212   
 
This position was also expressed by Justice Powell in his concurrence in 
Fullilove.  In drawing the distinction, he noted that “[t]he history of this Court’s review 
of congressional action demonstrates beyond question that the national Legislature is 
competent to find constitutional and statutory violations.”213  He thus concluded that “it 
is beyond question, therefore, that Congress has the authority to identify unlawful 
discriminatory practices, to prohibit those practices, and to prescribe remedies to 
eradicate their continuing effects.”214 
 
B.  Strict Scrutiny Analysis: 
 
1.  Compelling state interest 
                                                 
suggestion that any Member of this Court has repudiated in this case his 
or her previously expressed views on the subject, post, at 2123- 2125, 2127, 
is incorrect. 
Id. at 230-31. 
209  City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989). 
210  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 309 (1978). 
211  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309 (“Petitioner does not purport to have made, and is in no position to 
make, such findings.”). 
212  Id. 
213  Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 498  ( Powell, J. concurring). 
214  Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 498 (1980), overruled by Adarand Constructors v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (Powell, J. concurring).  Id. at 502. 
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It is axiomatic that the goal of remedying past discrimination or the present 
effects of past discriminatory practices215 can serve as a basis for use of race-based 
classifications.216  Prior to the development and implementation of a race-based 
affirmative action program, Congress must establish a “strong basis in evidence for its 
conclusion that remedial action was necessary.”217  Thus it would require proof of the 
existence of prior discrimination or the present effects of discrimination within the field 
of higher education.218  As Justice Powell noted in Bakke, “[t]he State certainly has a 
legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating, or eliminating where feasible, the 
                    
215  Definition of present effects of past discrimination: 
Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 153 (4th Cir. 1994) (“To have a present effect of past 
discrimination sufficient to justify the program, the party seeking to implement the program 
must, at a minimum, prove that the effect it proffers is caused by the past discrimination and 
that the effect is of sufficient magnitude to justify the program.”). 
216  Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O’Connor, J. concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment) (“The Court is in agreement that . . . remedying past or present 
racial discrimination . . . is a sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the remedial use of a 
carefully constructed affirmative action program.”); See also Id. at 274 (Powell, J. plurality) 
(“This Court has never held that societal discrimination alone is sufficient to justify a racial 
classification.  Rather, the Court has insis ted upon some showing of prior discrimination by 
the governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of racial classifications in order to 
remedy such discrimination.”); Id. at 286 (O’Connor, J. concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment) (“The Court is in agreement that, whatever the formulation employed, remedying 
past or present racial discrimination by a state actor is a sufficiently weighty state interest to 
warrant the remedial use of a carefully constructed affirmative action program.”); Fullilove, 
448 U.S. at 497 (Powell, J. concurring) (“The Government does have a legitimate interest in 
ameliorating the disabling effects of identified discrimination.”). 
217 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986). 
218  Congress together with the Federal Communications Commission, made a similar finding 
of past discrimination in the field of mass communications.  In Metro Broadcasting, the FCC 
promulgated a program to encourage minority participation in communications industry.  
Although the case primarily focused on the attainment of diversity as a constitutional basis 
for the FCC’s preferential incentive program, the FCC and Congress also argued that there 
was a remedial basis for the program.  
Congress found that ‘the effects or past inequities stemming from racial 
and ethnic discrimination have resulted in a severe underrepresentation of 
minorities in the media of mass communications.’  Citations omitted.  
Congress and the Commission do not justify the minority ownership 
policies strictly as remedies for victims of this discrimination, however. 
Rather, Congress and the FCC have selected the minority ownership 
policies primarily to promote programming diversity, and they urge that 
such diversity is an important governmental objective that can serve as a 
constitutional basis for the preference policies. 
Metro Broadcasting, Inc., v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566 (1990). 
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disabling effects of identified discrimination.”219  He further noted that the Court has 
“never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as members of relatively 
victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, 
legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations.”220  There 
is an unresolved  question regarding the scope and specificity required of such 
Congressional findings. 
 
Justice Powell has, however, provided guidance in this area.  He stated that the 
“degree of specificity required in the findings of discrimination and the breadth of 
discretion in the choice of remedies may vary with the nature and authority of a 
governmental body.”221  Congress as a national governing body has broader 
investigative and remedial powers than municipal or state governments.  The Court has 
approved this deferential approach to Congressional decision-making.222    For example, 
strict scrutiny analysis rejects the argument that societal discrimination  can also serve 
as a compelling justification for the use of race-based remedial measures.  Justice 
Powell in Wygant argued that the Court requires “some showing of prior discrimination 
by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of racial classifications in 
order to remedy such discrimination.”223  In defining “societal” discrimination, Justice 
                    
219  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978). 
220  Id.  “Before relying upon these sorts of findings in establishing a racial classification, a 
governmental body must have the authority and capability to establish, in the record, that the 
classification is responsive to identified discrimination.” Id. at 309.  See also Justice Powell, 
plurality opinion in Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 (“In the absence of particularized findings, a court 
could uphold remedies that are ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability 
to affect the future.”).  Justice O’Connor, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in 
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286 (“This remedial purpose need not be accompanied by 
contemporaneous findings of actual discrimination to be accepted as legitimate as long as the 
public actor has a firm basis for believing that remedial action is required.”). 
221  Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 515 (1980), (Powell, J., concurring) overruled by 
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
222  Id. at 472.  
A program that employs racial or ethnic criteria, even in a remedial context, 
calls for close examination;  yet we are bound to approach our task with 
appropriate deference to the Congress, a co-equal branch charged by the 
Constitution with the power to "provide for the  . . .  general Welfare of the 
United States" and "to enforce, by appropriate legislation," the equal 
protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Art. I, §8, cl. 1;  
Amdt. 14, §5. 
Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 563 (“We explained [in Fullilove] that deference was 
appropriate in light of Congress' institutional competence as the National Legislature . . . as 
well as Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause .  . , the Spending Clause, . . . , and the 
Civil War Amendments.”). 
223  Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274. 
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O’Connor points out that it is “discrimination that is not traceable to [government 
agency’s] own actions.”224 
 
To the extent that Congress, through the exercise of its legislative authority, 
engaged in specific acts of discrimination, Congress may use race-based measures to 
eliminate the effects of those acts.  However, Congressional remedial authority may also 
come into play if Congress was a “passive participant” in the discriminatory conduct of 
others, and acts to alleviate the effects of that conduct as well.  The basis for the 
Court’s reasoning in this regard can be found in the exercise of the government’s 
spending powers.  The Court has previously established that government entities may 
intervene to eliminate racially discriminatory structures that receive public financing.  In 
Croson, the Court held that “[i]t is beyond dispute that any public entity, state or 
federal, has a compelling interest in assuring that public dollars, drawn from the tax 
contributions of all citizens, do not serve to finance the evil of private prejudice.”225 
 
In expanding on the connection between the exercise of spending powers and 
Congressional remedial authority previously discussed in Croson, the Court in Fullilove 
noted that  
 
Congress was exercising its powers under §5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in making a finding that past discrimination would cause 
federal funds to be distributed in a manner which reinforced prior 
patterns of discrimination.  While the States and their subdivisions 
may take remedial action when they possess evidence that their own 
spending practices are exacerbating a pattern of prior discrimination, 
they must identify that discrimination, public or private, with some 
specificity before they may use race-conscious relief.226  
 
The Court has had several opportunities to apply the “passive participant” 
theory within the context of determining the constitutionality of race-based remedial 
measures.  In Croson, the Court noted that “if the city could show that it had essentially 
become a ‘passive participant’ in a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements of 
the local construction industry, we think it clear that the city could take affirmative 
steps to dismantle such a system.”227  Also, in Fullilove, Congress approved a $4 
billion state and local public works bill that included a 10% minority set-aside 
provision.228  One of the primary objectives of the set-aside provision was to eliminate 
                    
224  Id. at 288 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
225  City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989). 
226  Id. at 504.  
227  Id. at 492. 
228  Fullilove v. Klutnick, 448 U.S. 448, 453 (1980), overruled by Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 
515 U.S. 200 (1995).  One proponent of the bill stated that its purpose was to “direct funds 
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barriers to and encourage minority participation in the government contracting and 
procurement program.229   Although there was no direct evidence that Congressional 
legislation was the source of such barriers, the Court deferred to Congress’s authority 
to remedy what it perceived as a violation of the equal protection guarantees of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.230  For example, the Civil Rights Commission found several 
barriers to the entry of minority contractors in the government procurement program. 
 
Among the major difficulties confronting minority businesses were 
deficiencies in working capital, inability to meet bonding requirements, 
disabilities caused by an inadequate ‘track record,’ lack of awareness 
of bidding opportunities, unfamiliarity with bidding procedures, 
preselection before the formal advertising process, and the exercise of 
discretion by government procurement officers to disfavor minority 
businesses.231 
 
These findings and others presented by other governmental agencies, including the 
General Accounting Office, indicated that minorities were excluded from the 
government procurement program as a result of societal discrimination, and not the 
exercise of direct Congressional authority.  Although the Court viewed Congress as a 
passive participant in this process, it concluded that this legislation was a valid exercise 
of Congressional Spending Powers.232  
                                                 
into the minority business community, a sector of the economy sorely in need of economic 
stimulus but which, on the basis of past experience with Government procurement programs, 
could not be expected to benefit significantly from the public works programs as then 
formulated.”  Id. at 459. 
229  Id. at 473.  (“The clear objective of the MBE provision is disclosed by our necessarily 
extended review of its legislative and administrative background.  The program was designed 
to ensure that, to the extent federal funds were granted under the Public Works Employment 
Act of 1977, grantees who elect to participate would not employ procurement practices that 
Congress has decided might result in perpetuation of the effects of prior discrimination which 
had impaired or foreclosed access by minority businesses to public contracting 
opportunities.”). 
230  Id. at 472.  (“A program that employs racial or ethnic criteria, even in a remedial context, 
calls for close examination; yet we are bound to approach our task with appropriate deference 
to the Congress, a co-equal branch charged by the Constitution with the power to ‘provide 
for the ... general welfare of the United States’ and ‘to enforce, by appropriate legislation,’ the 
equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) 
231  Id. at 467. 
232  Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473-475.   
Although the Act recites no preambulary "findings" on the subject, we are 
satisfied  that Congress had abundant historical basis from which it could 
conclude that traditional procurement practices, when applied to minority 
businesses, could perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination.  
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Congress’s role as a passive participant in the racial segregation of the 
broadcasting industry was also apparent in Metro Broadcasting. In this case, Congress 
and the FCC attempted to implement race-based incentive programs, the goal of which 
was to increase minority participation in the broadcasting industry.233  The 
government’s principle argument in support of the constitutionality of these remedial 
programs was related to its desire to foster diversity within the industry.234  However, 
Congress and the FCC also noted that they were acting to eliminate barriers to minority 
entry in the field that were caused by past discrimination.235  Although there were no 
allegations that government legislation or conduct were directly responsible for the past 
discrimination,236 the Court acknowledged the remedial authority utilized by Congress in 
                                                 
Accordingly, Congress reasonably determined that the prospective 
elimination of these barriers to minority firm access to public contracting 
opportunities generated by the 1977 Act was appropriate to ensure that 
those businesses were not denied equal opportunity to participate in 
federal grants to state and local governments, which is one aspect of the 
equal protection of the laws.  Insofar as the MBE program pertains to the 
actions of state and local grantees, Congress could have achieved its 
objectives by use of its power under S5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
We conclude that in this respect the objectives of the MBE provision are 
within the scope of the Spending Power. 
Id. at 478. 
233  The minority incentive program at issue in Metro Broadcasting had two primary 
components. “First, the Commission pledged to consider minority ownership as one factor in 
comparative proceedings for new licenses.” Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547, 556 (1990).  
The FCC also “outlined a plan to increase minority opportunities to receive reassigned and 
transferred licenses through the so-called ‘distress sale’ policy.”  Id. at 557. 
234  Id. at 566.  (“Congress and the Commission do not justify the minority ownership policies 
strictly as remedies for victims of this discrimination, however. Rather, Congress and the FCC 
have selected the minority ownership policies primarily to promote programming diversity, 
and they urge that such diversity is an important governmental objective that can serve as a 
constitutional basis for the preference policies.”) 
235  Congress found that "the effects of past inequities stemming from racial and ethnic 
discrimination have resulted in a severe underrepresentation of minorities in the media of 
mass communications."  Id. at 566. 
236  Id. at 553-54. 
Although for the past two decades minorities have constituted at least 
one-fifth of the United States population, during this time relatively few 
members of minority groups have held broadcast licenses.  In 1971, 
minorities owned only 10 of the approximately 7,500 radio stations in the 
country and none of the more than 1,000 television stations, . . . in 1978, 
minorities owned less than 1 percent of the Nation's radio and television 
stations, see FCC Minority Ownership Task Force, Report on Minority 
Ownership in Broadcasting 1 (1978) (hereinafter Task Force Report); and 
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this regard pursuant to constitutional  mandates.237 
 
When engaging in the legislative fact-finding process to determine the existence 
of past discrimination or the present effects of any discriminatory practices, the 
Congressional inquiry must be broader than that undertaken by other types of political 
entities.238  In order to determine if race-based remedial action is warranted, Justice 
Powell in Bakke noted that there must be “judicial, legislative, or administrative findings 
of constitutional or statutory violations.”239  Within the context of government action, 
                                                 
in 1986, they owned just 2.1 percent of the more than 11,000 radio and 
television stations in the United States.  See National Association of 
Broadcasters, Minority Broadcasting Facts 6 (Sept.1986).  Moreover, these 
statistics fail to reflect the fact that, as late entrants who often have been 
able to obtain only the less valuable stations, many minority  broadcasters 
serve geographically limited markets with relatively small audiences. 
Id. at 554. 
237  Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 563. 
It is of overriding significance in these cases that the FCC's minority 
ownership programs have been specifically approved--indeed, 
mandated--by Congress.  In Fullilove v. Klutznick , 448 U.S. 448, 100 S.Ct. 
2758, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980), Chief Justice Burger, writing for himself and 
two other Justices, observed that although "[a] program that employs 
racial or ethnic criteria . . . calls for close examination," when a program 
employing a benign racial classification is adopted by an administrative 
agency at the explicit direction of Congress, we are "bound to approach 
our task with appropriate deference to the Congress, a co-equal branch 
charged by the Constitution with the power to 'provide for the . . . general 
Welfare of the United States' and 'to enforce, by appropriate legislation,' 
the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." (Citations 
omitted)  We explained that deference was appropriate in light of Congress' 
institutional competence as the National Legislature, . . . as well as 
Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause, . . . ;the Spending Clause, . . 
. , and the Civil War Amendments. 
Id. at 563. 
238  Appendix-The Compelling Interest for Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement: A 
Preliminary Survey, Department of Justice, Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal 
Procurement,  Fed. Reg., Vol. 61, No. 101 (1996) (“Furthermore, in combatting (sic) 
discrimination and its effects, Congress has the latitude to develop national remedies for 
national problems.  Congress need not make findings of discrimination with the same degree 
of precision as do state or local governments.  Nor is it obligated to make findings of 
discrimination in every industry or region that may be affected by a remedial measure.”). 
239  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1998).  Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of 
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 206 (1986), (O’Connor, J., concurring)  (“This remedial purpose need not 
be accompanied by contemporaneous findings of actual discrimination to be accepted as 
legitimate as long as the public actor has a firm basis for believing that remedial action is 
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the scope of these findings is dependent on the branch of the political entity engaged in 
the inquiry.  Congress, as the national legislative body, is not bound by the same 
restrictions that limit municipalities and states to investigate only localized instances of 
discrimination.240  On the contrary, §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the 
Court, has given Congress the latitude to investigate and determine whether 
discrimination exists on a national level.  In discussing this issue, Justice Powell argued 
that “[t]he degree of specificity required in the findings of discrimination and the breath 
of discretion in the choice of remedies may vary with the nature and authority of the 
governmental body.”241 
 
The distinction between the scope of Congressional fact-finding, and fact-
finding undertaken by municipalities or states was set forth by Justice O’Connor in 
Croson. She noted that 
 
Congress has made national findings that there has been societal 
discrimination in a host of fields.  If all a state or local government 
need do is find a congressional report on the subject to enact a set-
aside program, the constraints of the Equal Protection cause will, in 
effect, have been rendered a nullity.242 
                                                 
required."). 
240  Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 565 (Brennan, J.) 
In fact, much of the language and reasoning in Croson reaffirmed the 
lesson of Fullilove that race-conscious classifications adopted by 
Congress to address racial and ethnic discrimination are subject to a 
different standard than such classifications prescribed by state and local 
governments.  For example, Justice O’Connor, joined by two other 
Members of this Court, noted that "Congress may identify and redress the 
effects of society-wide discrimination," and that Congress "need not make 
specific findings of discrimination to engage in race- conscious relief."  
Echoing Fullilove's emphasis on Congress as a National Legislature that 
stands above factional politics, Justice Scalia argued that as a matter of 
"social reality and governmental theory," the Federal Government is 
unlikely to be captured by minority racial or ethnic groups and used as an 
instrument of discrimination.  Justice Scalia explained that "[t]he struggle 
for racial justice has historically been a struggle by the national society 
against oppression in the individual States," because of the "heightened 
danger of oppression from political factions in small, rather than large, 
political units." 
Id. at 565-66. (Citations ommitted). 
241  Fulllove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 515, n.14 (1980), overruled by Adarand Constructors v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, (1995) (Powell, J., concurring). 
242  City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989); Justice Powell, in Fullilove 
discussed the breath of Congress’s fact finding authority.  He noted that: 
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This distinction was apparent in the Court’s analysis of the race-based remedial 
programs at issue in Metro Broadcasting, Croson, Fullilove,  Wygant, and Adarand.  In 
these cases, challenges were made to race-based remedial programs established by a 
governmental entity.  Note that in Wygant and Croson the Court rejected the  factual 
predicate of past discrimination relied upon by the respective municipalities to justify 
their race-based remedial programs.243  The Court in each instance determined that the 
municipalities relied upon generalized findings of discrimination  that were indicative of 
broader societal discrimination, and not the particularized finds of discrimination 
required to overcome the constitutional invalidity of racial classifications.244  Although 
other equal protection challenges were raised, the Congressionally mandated findings of 
past discrimination were all upheld in the remaining cases due to the Court’s recognition 
of Congress’s authority to engage in national fact-finding. 
                                                 
The creation of national rules for the governance of our society simply 
does not entail the same concept of recordmaking that is appropriate to a 
judicial or administrative proceeding.  Congress has no responsibility to 
confine its vision to the facts and evidence adduced by particular parties.  
Instead, its special attribute as a legislative body lies in its broader mission 
to investigate and consider all facts and opinions that may be relevant to 
the resolution of an issue.  One appropriate source is the information and 
expertise that Congress acquires in the consideration and enactment of 
earlier legislation.  After Congress has legislated repeatedly in an area of 
national concern, its Members gain experience that may reduce the need 
for fresh hearings or prolonged debate when Congress again considers 
action in that area. 
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 502-03. 
243  J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 498. 
We think it clear that the factual predicate offered in support of the 
Richmond Plan suffers from the same two defects identified as fatal in 
Wygant.  The District Court found the city council's "findings sufficient to 
ensure that, in adopting the Plan, it was remedying the present effects of 
past discrimination in the construction industry."  Like the "role model" 
theory employed in Wygant, a generalized assertion that there has been 
past discrimination in an entire industry provides no guidance for a 
legislative body to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to 
remedy.  It "has no logical stopping point."  "Relief" for such an ill-defined 
wrong could extend until the percentage of public contracts awarded to 
MBE's in Richmond mirrored the percentage of minorities in the population 
as a whole. 
Id. 
244  Id. at 491.  (citing Associated General Contractors of Cal. v. City of San Francisco, 813 
F.2d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 1987)) (“The city is not just like the federal government with regard to 
the findings it must make to justify race-conscious remedial action.”). 
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A Congressional inquiry into the existence of discrimination or the present 
effects of past discrimination within the educational arena would not be 
unprecedented.245  Congress, the Department of Justice, the Small Business 
Administration, and additional governmental agencies engaged in a coordinated effort to 
examine the government procurement and contracting program following Adarand.246  
The purpose of this investigation was to establish a factual predicate for the continued 
implementation of race-based contract decision that would satisfy the strict scrutiny 
analysis mandated by Adarand.  
 
In developing a strategic plan for Congressional review of the existence of 
discrimination or the present effects of past discrimination within the educational arena, 
several factors must be considered.  As indicated in Section IV.B.1. above, there must 
be a “strong basis in evidence”247 for concluding that race-based affirmative action is 
the appropriate remedy.  Further, such evidence cannot broadly sweep across every 
segment of American society searching for generalized findings of discrimination 
against racial and ethnic minority groups.248  On the contrary, to establish that Congress 
                    
245  In 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson initiated a national dialogue on the socio-economic 
condition of poor Americans.  Pinned as the “War on Poverty,’ government agencies, 
economic advisors, and Congress worked together to identify problems such as sub-standard 
housing, education, health care, and unemployment that plagued this segment of the 
population.  After numerous Congressional hearings, and the submission of reports and 
studies on this subject, Congress passed the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 which 
established a number of programs designed to “eliminat[e] poverty by giving all Americans 
opportunities for work, for education and training and for the chance to live in ‘decency and 
dignity.’” Louise Lander, ed., War on Poverty, 21 (Facts on File, Inc. 1967) 
246  See, inquiry into contracting industry, Appendix-The Compelling Interest for Affirmative 
Action in Federal Procurement: A Preliminary Survey, Department of Justice, Proposed 
Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement, 61 Fed.Reg., 101(1996). 
247  J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 500. 
248  See, inquiry into contracting industry Appendix-The Compelling Interest for Affirmative 
Action in Federal Procurement: A Preliminary Survey, Department of Justice, Proposed 
Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement. 61 Fed.Reg. 101, May 23, 1996, at 
26042, 26051.  (“In evaluating the evidentiary predicate for affirmative action in federal 
procurement, it is highly significant that the measures have been authorized by Congress, 
which has the unique and express constitutional power to pass laws to ensure the fulfillment 
of the guarantees of racial equality in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.  These 
explicit constitutional commands vest Congress with the authority to remedy discrimination 
by private actors as well as state and local governments.  Congress may also exercise its 
constitutionally grounded spending and commerce powers to ensure that discrimination in 
our nation is not inadvertently perpetuated through government procurement practices.  In 
exercising its remedial authority, Congress need not target only deliberate acts of 
discrimination.  It may also strive to eliminate the effects of discrimination that continue to 
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has a compelling interest in remedying discrimination within the educational community, 
the Congressional investigation must be limited in a number of ways. 
 
a.  Time frame 
 
First, an appropriate time frame must be established for  determining the 
existence of discrimination within this context.  Although the process of judicial 
dismantling of segregated educational institutions began with Brown, many judicial and 
legislative hurdles, including the passage of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
followed that historic decision.249  Any attempts to determine when wholesale de jure 
segregation ended must realistically acknowledge that this was a gradual process that 
occurred over a significant period of time.  However, discriminatory patterns and 
practices that are too remote in time will not serve as a compelling justification for the 
                                                 
impair opportunity for minorities, even in the absence of ongoing, intentional acts of 
discrimination.”);See also, Oversight Hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One 
Hundredth Congress, First Session on Sex and Race Differences on Standardized Tests, April 
23, 1987, Serial No. 93. 
249  See also, STEPHAN THERNSTROM AND ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND 
WHITE 105 (1997). 
Brown I stated the principle; Brown II was a guide to implementation, and 
it sent a signal of extreme patience and considerable flexibility.  To begin 
with, the task of determining what desegregation remedy was appropriate 
in each community and of setting a realistic timetable for implementing that 
remedy was left to local federal district judges.  As a result, individual 
black parents had to bring complaints on a case-by-case basis when local 
authorities were indifferent to the law.  In the course of the prolonged 
struggle that followed, the NAACP had to assume the burden of initiating 
desegregation suits in more than two thousand southern school districts. 
In addition, the Court ordered districts operating single-race 
schools to proceed toward dismantling their dual school systems ‘with all 
deliberate speed.’  ‘With ... speed’ would seem to have meant 
expeditiously, but in fact the permission to proceed at a ‘deliberate’ pace 
was the more important message.  In the Border states, where black 
population concentrations were smaller and the caste system was not as 
rigidly enforced, desegregation did proceed with some dispatch and little 
conflict.  But in the eleven ex-Confederate states ‘deliberate’ meant not 
slow but stop.  There, a full decade after Brown, a mere 1.2 percent of black 
public school students attended schools that had any white pupils at all.  
Desegregation, one observer remarked, was proceeding with ‘the pace of 
an extraordinary arthritic snail.’ 
Id. 
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use of race-based remedial measures.250   Unfortunately, there is no magic formula for 
determining an appropriate time period.  Limited guidance may be found by examining 
the time periods utilized by Congress in similar inquiries.251  
 
b.  Scope of Congressional inquiry 
 
As discussed in Section IV.A. above, a Congressional inquiry into the systemic 
policies, patterns, and practices of educational institutions must specifically identify 
evidence of discrimination or the present effects of past racial discrimination.  As 
Justice O’Connor determined in Croson:   
 
Proper findings in this regard are necessary to define both the scope 
of the injury and the extent of the remedy necessary to cure its 
effects.  Such findings also serve to assure all citizens that the 
deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic 
groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of the 
goal of equality itself.  Absent such findings, there is a danger that a 
racial classification is merely the product of unthinking stereotypes or 
a form of racial politics.  ‘[I]f there is no duty to attempt either to 
measure the recovery by the wrong or to distribute that recovery 
within the injured class in an evenhanded way, our history will 
adequately support a legislative preference for almost any ethnic, 
religious, or racial group with the political strength to negotiate 'a 
piece of the action' for its members.’252  
 
Pursuant to the provisions of Title VI, educational institutions, both public and 
private, that receive federal funds are prohibited from engaging in racially discriminatory 
conduct.253  The focus of the inquiry will include not only Congressional actions, but 
                    
250  Id. Middleton v. City of Flint, 92 F.3d 396, 409 (6th Cir. 1996).  (“Furthermore, as this court 
has noted previously, evidence of past discrimination that is remote in time will not support a 
claim of compelling governmental interest when other evidence is adduced to show that the 
governmental body has taken serious steps in subsequent years to reverse the effects of past 
discrimination and to implement appropriate new standards.  Thus in Brunet v. City of 
Columbus, 1 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 1993), we held that strong evidence proffered in 1989 that a city 
fire department had discriminated prior to 1975 “is too remote to support a compelling 
governmental interest to justify the affirmative action plan, “especially in light of evidence 
that the city had subsequently taken steps to improve its recruitment efforts.”) 
251  See, inquiry into contracting industry in which they examined Congressional findings for a 
twenty-six period from 1980 through 1996.  Appendix-The Compelling Interest for Affirmative 
Action in Federal Procurement: A Preliminary Survey, Department of Justice, Proposed 
Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement, 61 Fed. Reg. No. 101 (1996). 
252  J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S., at 510-11. 
253  Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that “[n]o person in the United States 
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on the actions of institutions of higher education governed by the provisions of Title VI 
because of their receipt of federal funds.  The data assembled for this inquiry may 
focus on a number of  disputed areas that fall within the scope of Title VI.  There must, 
however, be a recognition that there are two somewhat distinct areas within the 
educational field - students and faculty.  One area of inquiry may focus on the existence 
of discrimination relating to faculty hiring, retention, and promotion.254  Also included in 
the Congressional inquiry would be the equally important issues related to student 
admissions and retention.255   As the following indicates, a number of highly disputed 
areas could be included within the scope of student related issues: 
 
· Cultural, racial or ethnic bias on standardized tests256 such as the 
                                                 
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance.”  42 U.S.C §2000d. 
254  See generally, Edgar G. Epps, Affirmative Action and Minority Access to Faculty 
Positions, 59 OHIO STATE L. J. 755 (1998); Deborah Jones Merritt and Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, 
Race, and Credentials: The Truth about Affirmative Action in the Law Faculty Hiring, 97 
COLUM.L.REV. 199 (1997); Caroline Sootello Viernes Turner and Samuel L. Myers, Jr., Faculty 
Diversity and Affirmative Action, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION'S TESTAMENT OF HOPE: STRATEGIES 
FOR A NEW ERA IN HIGHER EDUCATION 131 (Mildred Garcia ed., 1997); Deborah J. Merritt and 
Barbara F. Reskin, The Double Minority: Empirical Evidence of a Double Standard in Law 
School Hiring of Minority Women, 65 S.CAL. L. REV. 29 (1992). 
255  See generally, Deborah Jones Merritt, Symposium: Twenty Years After Bakke: The Law 
and Social Science of Affirmative Action in Higher Education, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1055 (1998); 
Why a Nationwide Ban on Race-Conscious Admissions Will Sharply Curtail Black 
Enrollments as the Nation's Highest-Ranked Medical Schools, 23 JOURNAL OF BLACKS IN 
HIGHER EDUCATION 22 (Spring 1999); William G. Bowen and Derek Bok, The Shape of the 
River: Long-term Consequences on Considering Race in College and University Admissions 
(Princeton University Press 1998); SUSAN WELCH AND JOHN GRUHL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND 
MINORITY ENROLLMENTS IN MEDICAL AND LAW SCHOOLS (1998); LINDA F. WIGHTMAN, 
STANDARDIZED TESTING AND EQUAL ACCESS: A TUTORIAL,  CHAPTER 4, IN COMPELLING 
INTEREST: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE ON RACIAL DYNAMICS IN HIGHER EDUCATION, 
Prepublication Draft Advance Copy, A Report of the AERA Panel on Racial Dynamics in 
Colleges and Universities (Mitchell Chang, Daria Witt, James Jones, Kenji Hakuta, eds., 
1999)(On file with the author);  ELLIS COSE, COLOR-BLIND 136-37 (1997); Theodore Cross and 
Robert Bruce Slater, Special Report: Why the End of Affirmative Action Would Exclude All 
But a Very Few Blacks form America's Leading Universities and Graduate Schools, J. OF 
BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC., September 30, 1997, at 8. 
256  For discussions of racial and cultural bias, see generally STEPHAN THERNSTROM AND 
ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE 348-422 (1997); CHRISTOPHER JENCKS 
AND MEREDITH PHILLIPS, THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP (1998); CHILLING ADMISSIONS: 
THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CRISIS AND THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES  (Gary Orfield and 
Edward Miller, eds., 1998); Roberto Rodriguez, Test-Driven Admissions: ETS Responds to 
Criticism of SATs, Black Issues in Higher Education, September 5, 1996, at 7;  Leslie G. 
72
Akron Law Review, Vol. 33 [2000], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol33/iss2/1
2000] PRIVATE PROBLEM, PUBLIC SOLUTION                               
 
PSAT, SAT, ACT, LSAT, GRE, and MCAT 257 
 
· Reliance on the accuracy of numerical predictors such as grade point 
averages and standardized test scores258 
 
· Access to public and private sources of financial assistance 
 
· Access to academic counselors and preparatory assistance 
 
· Bias in the development, administration, and implementation of 
admissions policies259 
 
· Under-representation of racial and ethnic minorities in certain 
professional fields of study 
 
For example, the controversy surrounding continued use of standardized 
admissions tests has not escaped Congressional scrutiny.260  In May, 1999, the Office 
of Civil Rights ("OCR") of the U.S. Department of Education distributed a draft version 
of a guidebook entitled "Nondiscrimination in High-Stakes Testing: A Resource 
                                                 
Espinoza, The LSAT: Narratives and Bias, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 121 (1993). 
257  The Pre-Scholastic Aptitude Test(PSAT), Scholastic Aptitude Test(SAT),  Graduate 
Record Examination(GRE), Medical College Admissions Test(MCAT) are administered by 
Educational Testing Services.  The ACT Assessment is administered by American College 
Testing, Law Services administers the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT). 
258  See generally, Nicholas Lemann, Behind the SAT, Book Expert, Adapted from "The Big 
Test: The Secret History of the American Meritocracy," September 6, 1999 at 52; A 
Measurement of What? Although 'Reliably Constant,' Experts Say Standardized Test Scores 
Are Often Misunderstood, Black Issues in Higher Education, September 4, 1997, at 18;  Susan 
Strum and Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action:  Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 
84 CALIFORNIA L. REV. 953, 957 (1996).  (“Typical among the existing criteria and selection 
methods are paper-and-pencil tests, such as the Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT), the Law 
School Admissions Test (LSAT), and civil service exams.  These tests, which are used to 
predict future performance based on existing capacity or ability, do not correlate with future 
performance for most applicants, at least not as a method of ranking those 'most qualified.'  
These tests and informal criteria making up our 'meritocracy' tell us more about past 
opportunity than about future accomp lishments on the job or in the classroom.”). 
259  See generally, SYLVIA HURTADO AND CHRISTINE NAVIA, RECONCILING COLLEGE ACCESS AND 
THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE,  IN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION'S TESTAMENT OF HOPE: 
STRATEGIES FOR A NEW ERA IN HIGHER EDUCATION 105 (1997). 
260  See Sex and Race Differences on Standardized Tests: Oversight Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of 
Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, First Session on Sex and Race Differences on 
Standardized Tests, April 23, 1987, Serial No. 93. 
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Guide."261  This guidebook provides educational institutions with a framework to insure 
that their use of standardized admissions tests conform with the anti-discrimination 
mandates of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The guidebook provides, in 
pertinent part, that "the use of any educational test which has a significant disparate 
impact on members of any particular race, national origin, or sex is discriminatory."262  
This initial draft guidebook required educational institutions to justify their use of 
standardized admissions tests as "educationally necessary," and further provided that the 
institutions establish that no "practical alternative" for increasing the number of racial 
minorities and women was available.263  The Department of Education received 
considerable criticism from Congress, testing services, and educational institutions 
regarding the proposed guidelines.264  In response to concerns raised during 
Congressional hearings on the matter, the Department of Education agreed to modify 
the guidelines to "conform to existing law."265  Although this issue appears resolved at 
the moment, unresolved questions remain about the exclusion of racial and ethnic 
minorities from access to avenues of higher education.   
 
2.  Narrow tailoring 
 
As discussed in Section IV.B.1. above, Congress must initially find evidence of 
either past discrimination or the present effects of past discrimination in the field of 
higher education.  Such a finding would support a finding of a compelling state interest 
sufficient to justify the facial as well as applied use of race-based remedies.  Thereafter, 
the federal entity charged with developing a race-based remedial affirmative action 
program would be responsible for insuring that the scope of the remedy be narrowly 
tailored to specifically address the problems identified by the Congressional findings.266 
                    
261  Amy Dockser Marcus, Standardized Test Guide Could Lead to Lawsuits, WALL STREET 
J., May 5, 26, 1999, at A2. 
262  Id. 
263  Id. 
264  Patrick Healy, Education Dept. Official tells Congress Guidelines on Testing Won't 
Burden Colleges, Chron. Higher Educ., July 2, 1999 at A30; Jeffrey Selingo, Colleges urge 
civil-rights office to revise guidelines on testing, Chron. Higher Educ., July 23, 1999, at A58. 
265  In her testimony on June 22, 1999, before  the House Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigation of the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, Norma V. Cantu', 
Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, stated that "[w]e will make the language clear to conform 
to existing law . . . yes, the language will change."  Statement of Norma V. Cantu', Assistant 
Secretary for Civil Rights, Before the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 
of the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, June 22, 1999.  After receipt of 
comments from interested educators, testing services, and the public, the OCR will issue a 
final version of the guidebook in Fall, 1999. 
266 Rothe Development Corp. v. US DOD, 49 F. Supp. 2d 937 (W.D. Texas 1999). 
The three post-Adarand cases that have addressed the question of 
whether the federal government's SBA-based remedial program was 
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 Supreme  Court  precedent does offer guidance in this area.  In United States v. 
Paradise,267 the Court developed a set of objectives that must be considered when 
evaluating whether racial classifications are narrowly tailored enough to overcome the 
strict scrutiny of the equal protection paradigm.  In Paradise, Justice Brennan 
articulated the following narrow tailoring standard: 
 
In determining whether race-conscious remedies are appropriate, we 
look to several factors, including the necessity for the relief and the 
efficacy of alternative remedies; the flexibility and duration of the 
relief, including the availability or waiver provisions; the relationship of 
the numerical goals to the relevant labor market; and the impact of the 
relief on the rights of third parties.268 
 
  The notion that strict scrutiny is “fatal in fact” is never more apparent than 
when searching for a race-based remedial program  
capable of withstanding the challenge that the program does not conform to the narrow 
tailoring component of the equal protection paradigm.  However, until such time as 
Congressional findings  indicate that present effects of past discrimination continue to 
impact the field of higher education, a thorough discussion of ways in which a program 
                                                 
narrowly tailored to its purpose have unanimously agreed that it is not. 
Each of these courts held, however, that the Government had a compelling 
purpose in acting. The Court is  troubled by the implicit suggestion in these 
opinions that, while the federal government may be given more deference 
than state and local governments in articulating a compelling purpose for 
remedial action, it must nonetheless be rigidly held to the standards set 
forth in Croson, a case involving the actions of a municipality, if it is to 
show that its action is narrowly tailored to that purpose. If Congress is to 
be allowed a broad vision of the nation's problems, it seems only logical 
that it be allowed some measure of deference in addressing those 
problems. In other words, there must be some relationship between the 
breadth of the problem to be remedied and the breadth of the remedy to be 
allowed. Strict application of the Croson criteria, without consideration of 
Congress's role in addressing issues that face the nation as a whole, will 
almost inevitably result in the invalidation of congressional remedial 
measures. Such automatic invalidation would render strict scrutiny "strict 
in theory; fatal in fact," a result that the Supreme Court has explicitly 
rejected. 
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995); See also, Sherbrooke Sodding Co., 17 
F.Supp.2d 1026 (D. Minn. 1998); Cortez III Service Corp. v. NASA, 950 F.Supp. 357 (D.D.C. 
1996); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 964 F.Supp. 1556 (1997), judgment vacated and 
remanded with directions to dismiss, 163 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 1999). 
267  United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987). 
268  Id. at 171. 
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might be narrowly tailored is premature. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
At this juncture in the evolution of the Equal Protection Clause the Court finds 
itself at an impasse.  Although the application of the strict scrutiny test fosters a sense 
that the constitution is a racially neutral document, this interpretation remains in 
opposition to the realities of the American social and political framework.  Questions 
remain regarding whether there is a causal link between the continuing effects of 
discrimination and the minimal number of racial and ethnic minorities enrolled in 
institutions of higher education.  In addition, the ability of pubic and private actors to 
implement race-based remedial measures  remains a constitutional mystery.  While we 
wait for that “perfect” affirmative action test case to work its way up to the Supreme 
Court, the viability of race-based affirmative action programs is  questionable.  
Unfortunately, we have run out of time and can no longer wait for a judicial solution 
when equally viable avenues of relief are available. 
 
That this is an issue of national importance is not subject to dispute.  It is the 
very nature of this national issue which calls for a remedial solution that is both national 
in scope and mandated by the provisions of the constitution.  Treating the question of 
the viability of race-based affirmative action programs as a political, not solely judicial 
issue is one important step toward finding an overarching, expedient remedy that could 
exist within the constitutionally permissible parameters of the strict scrutiny analysis. 
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